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THE LAW OF COMMERCIAL DISPARAGEMENT: BUSINESS
DEFAMATION'S IMPOTENT ALLY
PEOPLE make economic choices largely on the basis of information they
get from others. Even if the prospective customer makes a personal investi-
gation, he frequently lacks the knowledge necessary to appraise the merits
of a product.' Nor can many consumers personally scrutinize an organiza-
tion's business methods.2 In addition, suppliers and other prospective creditors
often rely heavily on credit ratings and other indicia of an enterprise's busi-
ness reputation.3 A business may therefore suffer real injury when either a
competing or an impartial party derogates its solvency, its business methods,
or the quality of the product it sells.4 The resulting damage may prompt
the organization to seek redress.
Social policy, however, generally bars relief when the derogatory statement
is true.5 Even when the statement is false or misleading, the injured enter-
prise may find that the host of available sanctions do not, for all their com-
plexity, afford it adequate protection.
1. For the sake of simplicity, the term "product" is used throughout this Comment
to denote anything which is sold. As well as manufactured articles, "product" includes
services-such as dry cleaning or repair work-and non-manufactured goods-such as
livestock or food products.
While agents of business organizations may have skill enough to judge products
accurately, the individual consumer generally does not. See Kapp, Rational Huwna Con-
duct and Modern Industrial Society, 10 SOUTHuERN EcoN. J. 136, 141-2, 147 (1943). Of
course, consumers' choices are frequently influenced by non-rational considerations.
Imitation of the wealthy, sales persuasion, and emotional preferences usually play im-
portant roles. Id. at 142 et scq.
2. If the customer has had previous contact with the seller, he may have learned
something about the seller's business methods by himself. But many sellers deal with
their customers without personal contact. Perhaps the most e.treme example is the mail
order house, which may sell to thousands of customers by remote control. And even a
local retailer has several customers; one of his clientele may hear second-hand news
about his dealings with other customers.
3. See JACOBY AND SAULNIER, TF,.x LENDING TO BusuiEss 9D (1942).
4. Statements will be classified arbitrarily throughout this Comment as concerning
(1) financial status, (2) business methods, and (3) products. Some statements, such as
those alleging that a company has gone out of business, do not fit squarely within one
category. The status of such statements will be noted when each category is discussed.
5. Wolff, Unfair Competition by Truthful Disparagement, 47 YAm LJ. 1304 (1933).
The author points out that before the Second World War German and French courts
imposed liability for certain statements without inquiring into their truth or falsity. Id. at
1311, 1317-8. He suggests that American courts should enjoin most harmful statements
made about a competing business, even when the statements are true. Volff, wupra,
passim. See note 28 infra.
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NON-JUDICIAL RELIEF
An injured enterprise can request consumers' organizations to urge aban-
donment of the derogatory publication or to publish information in rebuttal.0
But consumer groups may take no action concerning products sold primarily
to businesses. 7 Even when a group does act, information which it dissemi-
nates may not reach the bulk of the injured party's clientele,8 or the dis-
parager may be relatively immune to pressure.
0
The injured business may turn for redress to a trade association when it
and the offender are both members.' 0 But here also, adequate sanctions may
6. The most prominent groups devoted to protection of consumers are Better Busi-
ness Bureaus, over ninety of which are located in the major cities of the United States
and Canada. See AssociATioN OF BErrm BusiNEss BuREAus, Acrivrv HiGnuourITS
1952 p. 1 (1953) (copy on file in Yale Law Library). The local Bureaus Publish bulletins
and exert influence to correct business abuses in their respective localities. See, e.g., coin-
munication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Allan E. Backman, Executive Vice-President,
National Better Business Bureau, dated April 14, 1953, in Yale Law Library. And the
Bureaus act to curb disparagement and defamation. See, e.g., National Better Business
Bureau News Bulletin, January, 1953, p. 1 (copy on file in Yale Law Library).
The Better Business Bureaus make up only one of several groups devoted to protect-
ing the consumer. For a comprehensive compilation, see GAER, CoNsuraxs Au 177 c
seq. (1940). Since the Bureaus constitute the largest and undoubtedly one of the most
effective organizations, they will be used here to exemplify all such groups.
7. The Bureaus claim that they take action in any case where there is evidence of
abuse. See, e.g., communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Richard Jordan, General
Manager, Better Business Bureau of Milwaukee, dated April 14, 1953, in Yale Law
Library. An analysis of the Bureau's activities in 1952, however, indicates that products
and services used almost exclusively by individual consumers accounted for the great
preponderance of the cases in which Bureaus took action. The following table was ab-
stracted from a summary prepared by the Association of Better Business Bureaus (copy
of summary on file in Yale Law Library):
Type of Product or Service Number of Bureau Itierventions
Primarily for Individuals 9,756
For Business and Individuals 315
Primarily for Business 37
8. The Bureaus have no comprehensive consumer mailing list. The National Bureau
directs its bulletins to advertising media, business firms, and the local Bureaus. See com-
munication from Allan E. Backman, supra note 6. The local Bureaus also publish bul-
letins, but samples which were examined indicate that such material is devoted almost
exclusively to reporting the Bureau's activities and contained little information for con-
sumers. See sample publications on file in Yale Law Library.
9. Of course, the disparager may operate primarily in an area where there is no local
Bureau. And the effectiveness of Bureau action depends on how much informal pressure
it can bring to bear, since it has no power to institute legal action. See communication
from Allan E. Backman, supra note 6. Hence fly-by-night organizations-likely dis-
paragers whose reputation with businessmen is already unsavory-may be slow to re-
spond. Of course, the Bureaus can turn over complaints to law enforcement authorities
with an eye to criminal proceedings. Ibid. But overworked prosecutors may not be en-
thusiastic about pressing charges. See note 21 infra and accompanying text.
10. At last count, there were roughly 12,000 trade associations active in the United
States. JuDKiNS, NATIONAL AssociAnONs OF THE UNITED STATEs viii (1949).
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be unavailable. Even those associations which promulgate codes condemning
"false or disparaging" statements 11 do not provide formal sanctions.'- And
informal enforcement is considered impracticable. 13
The Federal Trade Commission prohibits the making of false and disparag-
ing statements about another's products and/or business 14 and encourages pri-
vate parties to set proceedings in motion."; However, the number of cases
in which the Commission can grant effective relief is limited.1 0 Its juris-
11. A characteristic code of ethics decries "[m]aldng false or disparaging statements,
either written or oral, respecting a competitor's products, selling prices, business, financial
or personal standing.. . ." FAm PRAc-IcEs CODE OF DMIRY I-DusT aEs SuPPLY Ass'-.,
quoted in communication to the YALE LAW JOLTRNAL from Roberts Everett, Executive Vice-
President, dated April 23, 1953, in Yale Law Library. For a similar provision, see com-
munication to the YALE LAW JoupaqA. from Robert A. Jones, Executive Secretary, Farm
Equipment Institute, dated April 9, 1953, in Yale Law Library.
Some associations promulgate no code of ethics. See, e.g., communication to the YALE
LAW JoUmNAL from Donald M. White, Secretary, The Aluminum Association, dated
April 8, 1953, in Yale Law Library. Many trade groups have codified rules of ethics
through the Federal Trade Commission's Trade Practice Rules procedure, but these
norms are enforceable only through the Commission. See note 14 infra. There is some
indication that the FTC discourages trade associations from formulating codes without
its help. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from R. Kennedy Hanson, General
Manager, American Supply & 'Machinery Manufacturers' Ass'n, dated April 30, 1953, in
Yale Law Library.
12. See communications from Roberts Everett and Robert A. Jones, s sPra note 11.
Those associations which have no code of ethics, but maintain committees to deal vith
grievances do not, it seems, provide those committees with formal enforcement procedures.
See, e.g., communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from NV. Clarke S. Mays, Jr., Chair-
man, Ethics and Grievances Committee, Fountain Pen and Mechanical Pencil Manufac-
turers' Ass'n, dated April 17, 1953, in Yale Law Library.
13. See, e.g., communication to the YALE LAw JOURNAL from Jesse F. Jones, Jr., Assist-
ant Secretary, National Candy Wholesalers Ass'n, dated November 19, 1952, in Yale Law
Library. The reason given by trade groups for their hesitancy to act is the fear that dis-
cipline of members might invite antitrust proceedings. Confidential communication to the
YALE, LAW JouRNAL from trade association officer. But some associations have found
that an amicable conference with the offending party often serves to prevent repetition
of a misstatement. See, e.g., communication to the Y.=J LAW JOUi VAL from W. P. Ficl;ett,
President, Textile Fabrics Ass'n, dated November 17, 1952, in Yale Law Library. See
also communication from V. Clarke S. Mays, Jr., supra note 12.
14. E.g., Automatic Voting Machine Corp., 47 F.T.C. 106S (1951); Columbia Ap-
pliance Corp., 45 F.T.C. 379 (1948) ; Scientific Products, Inc., 20 F.T.C. 76 (1935).
The FTC often sets standards for fair competition in particular industries by holding
a Trade Practice Conference with industry members and formulating a set of Trade
Practice Rules. For a detailed study of the Trade Conference procedure, see Comment,
62 Yux.E L.J. 912 (1953). Of the 60 industry codes promulgated since 1940, 49 contain
a rule prohibiting disparagement of competitors' products. Id. at 926 n.104.
15. In the fiscal year 1952, the FTC received from private parties 2,544 complaints
of deceptive practices. FTC AN. REP. 40 (1952).
16. Even when a private party's complaint touches off FTC action, relief may be so
long delayed that it loses its impact. Unless the offending party agrees to desist, the case
must wend its way through complex and time-consuming procedure, and the effective
19531
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diction extends only to practices in interstate commerce.1 7 Furthermore, its
currently overwhelming case load prevents the Commission from handling
many violations technically within its control.' 8 Even when the FTC presses
action, the only available relief is an order to cease and desist; damages are
not awarded.' 9
Forty-four states have criminal statutes which penalize false advertising,
apparently including derogation of another business or its product.20 But
such legislation is not extremely helpful to an injured business seeking redress.
Prosecuting staffs usually concentrate their energies on more reprehensible
crimes.21 In any event, the enterprise is not compensated for the loss it has
suffered.
The important failings of all these sanctions may be summarized in two
categories: inadequate remedies and limited coverage of disputes. To protect
date of the Commission's action can be postponed for as long as five years. See Comment,
62 YALE L.J. 912, 913-15 (1953). For a detailed disucssion of FTC procedure, see Freer,
Federal Trade Commission Procedure and Practice, 8 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 316 (1940).
17. FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 351-5 (1941). And "interstate commerce" has
been narrowly defined for the purpose of limiting the area of FTC action. Ibid.
18. In the fiscal year 1952, FTC trial examiners handed down 109 decisions. See
Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 912, 914 n.19 (1953). During the same period, the Commission
received from private parties 2,544 complaints of deceptive practices alone. See note 15
szpra. The latter figure includes neither deceptive practice violations which the Commis-
sion discovered itself nor violations not involving deceptive practices. Even granting that
some of the offenders agreed to desist before a formal decision was handed down, the
disparity between the number of complaints and the number of final orders indicates a
severe overload.
19. Freer, supra note 16, at 330.
20. Twenty-six states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws patterned after
a model statute formulated by Printer's Ink magazine. ROPER, STATE ADVERTISING LEGIs-
LATON 3 (1945). The model statute provides, in part, that "[a]ny person, firm, corpora-
tion or association who, with intent to sell ...merchandise [or anything else offered]
to the public for sale or distribution, . . .makes . . .or causes, directly or indirectly, to
be made .... in a newspaper or other publication .... or in any other way, an advertise-
ment of any sort regarding merchandise [or anything else] so offered to the public, which
advertisement contains any . . .statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive, or mislead-
ing, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Id. at 291. Seventeen additional states have passed
legislation worded somewhat less comprehensively, in most cases because the statutes
impose liability only when the defendant knew that his statement was false. Id. at 3-4.
In addition, several states have similar criminal statutes aimed at false advertising of
specific commodities. Id. at 4.
The statutes were obviously designed primarily to penalize a seller for misrepresent-
ing his own goods. But so long as the statemnt is not true and is made in the course
of sales procedure, courts could reasonably interpret such a statute to prohibit the state-
ment. The simple fact that "every knock is a boost" might well prompt courts to do so.
Research, however, has unearthed no reported case in which a conviction resulted from
a statement about another's business or product.
For a discussion of the extent to which the law of criminal libel would penalize false
statements, see note 25 infra.
21. See Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. Jun. Soc'y 18, 19 (1940).
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itself fully, an injured business needs compensation for damage sustained
and assurance that no further damage will occur. None of the foregoing
sanctions compensate the business for injury already suffered. While all of
them purport to prevent future harm, only an FTC order can be enforced
effectively against renewed publication.2 2 And the FTC, like trade associa-
tions and consumer groups, can control only a limited area of controversy. -
To obtain maximum protection an injured organization must turn to the
courts for common law or equitable relief. Potentially at least, all the criteria
of effective redress are there present. Courts have traditionally taken juris-
diction over cases in which false statements have caused injury,24 and they
can award damages and issue injunctions. A would-be litigant soon learns,
however, that recovering damages is not always simple and that procuring
an injunction may be impossible.
DEFAMATION
Courts readily award damages for libel or slander.25 The plaintiff must
usually show only that the defamatory statement was made; the law pre-
22. Once an FTC order becomes final, each violation of it can incur a maximum
fine of $5,000. Where violation is continuing, each day of disobedience is considered a
separate offense. See Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 912, 914 n21 (1953).
23. See text at notes 7-13, 16-18 supra.
24. See notes 30, 53 infra.
25. Libel and slander comprise the two divisions of defamation. "A defamatory utter-
ance is one which has a tendency to injure the reputation of the person to whom it refers;
which tends... to cause him to be regarded with feelings of hatred, contempt, ridicule,
fear, dislike, or disesteem." SAut.oND, THE LAw OF Toxrs 393 (8th ed., Stallybrass,
1934) (hereinafter cited as SALmomD). Similar definitions appear in REsT.%TAmz ,,Torm
§ 559 (1938) (hereinafter cited as REsTA.TMENT); Pnossm, Tos 790 (1941) (herein-
after cited as PRossEm).
Apart from their civil liability, persons who publish defamatory statements are sub-
ject to prosecution for "criminal libel," so long as their statements are vitten or em-
bodied in some other enduring form. See, e.g., IL.. Am . ST.T. c. 33, § 402 (Smith-Hurd
1935). Either by statute or judicial decision, all the American jurisdictions penalize
criminal libel. See compilation in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255 n.5 (1952).
Prosecutions are, however, rare today. See Note, 52 COL. L. RLm' 521, 522 n.6 (1952).
26. Slanderous statements which tend to prejudice the plaintiff in his trade, business,
or profession are actionable without proof of actual injury. E.g., Axton Fisher Tobacco
Co. v. Evening Post Co., 169 Ky. 64, 76, 183 S.W. 269, 274 (1916) ; Edwards X-Ray Co.
v. Ritter Dental Mlfg. Co., 124 Misc. S98, 899, 210 N.Y. Supp. 299, 30D (Sup. Ct. 1925).
See I CooLEY, ToRts 474-86 (4th ed. 1932). At common law, any libel was actionable
without proof of actual damage, and many American jurisdictions still adhere to that
rule. PRossmE 797. But some American courts have required the plaintiff to prove actual
injury when the statement is not libelous on its face, but becomes so only when the plain-
tiff shows the circumstances under which it was made. Del Rico Co. v. New Mexican,
Inc., 56 N.M. 538,548,246 P.2d 206,212-13 (1952) ; Tower v. Crosby, 214 App. Div. 392,212
N.Y. Supp. 219 (4th Dep't 1925). See 28 CoL. L. REv. 1110 (192).
Courts often use the terms "general" and "special" damage in regard to defamation.
General damages are those which the law presumes to result from defamatory publica-
1953]
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sumes that injury has resulted.26 The defendant's culpability is immaterial, 7
and he can absolve himself only by proving that his statement was true.
28
Since a person is defamed by any false statement damaging his character
or reputation,29 courts have held for centuries that imputations about an in-
dividual trader's business may defame him.80 As the corporation developed,
courts recognized that these "artificial persons" had valuable "business repu-
tations" to preserve 31 and therefore allowed them to sue in defamation. 2
Unincorporated associations may often do likewise.3 A partnership may
be defamed,34 although in many states each partner must sue individually
tion. See Erick Bowman Remedy Co. v. Jensen Salsbery Laboratories, Inc., 17 F.2d 255,
260 (8th Cir. 1926). Special damage is actual pecuniary injury proven to result from
the defamation. Id. at 259-60.
27. The defendant is normally held liable even if his conduct was entirely without
fault or intention. Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909). See RESTATEMENT §§ 579-
80. But if the defendant spoke under certain extenuating circumstances, courts hold that
he had a privilege to speak. Asserting a privilege either bars recovery altogether or else
requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted with "malice." See text at notes
105-108 infra. Many American jurisdictions have passed legislation allowing a defendant
to mitigate damages by showing that he has published a retraction. Donnelly, The Law
of Defamation: Proposals For Reform, 33 MINN. L. Rv. 609, 614-15 (1949).
28. Most states make truth an absolute defense to a civil action for defamation. See
annotation in Ray, Trtth: A Defense To Libel, 16 MINN. L. REv. 43, 51 (1931). See
also RESTATEMENT § 582. In a few states, truth absolves the defendant only if it was
published with "good motives" or for "justifiable ends." PRossER 854. Proof of good
motives is generally necessary to defeat a prosecution for criminal libel. See Ray, supra,
at 47-8; Note, 52 CoL. L. Rzv. 521, 524-5 (1952).
29. See note 25 supra.
30. What appears to be the earliest recorded case was decided in 1583. See Don-
nelly, History of Defamation, [1949] Wis. L. Rxv. 99, 112 n.74.
31. See, e.g., Adolf Philipp Co. v. New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, 165 App. Div. 377,
392, 150 N.Y. Supp. 1044, 1053 (1st Dep't 1914).
32. Ohio & M. Ry. v. Press Pub. Co., 48 Fed. 206 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1891); Morrison-
Jewell Filtration Co. v. Lingane, 19 R.I. 316, 317, 33 Atl. 452, 453 (1895). Stockholders
cannot sue for statements defaming a corporation; the corporation itself must bring the
action. McBride v. Crowell-Collier Pub. Co., 196 F.2d 187, 189 (5th Cir. 1952) ; R. G.
Dun & Co. v. Shipp, 127 Tex. 80, 83, 91 S.W.2d 330, 332 (1936). Of course, when a
statement not only defames the corporation but a stockholder as well, the individual has a
cause of action for his personal injuries. E.g., R. G. Dun & Co. v. Shipp, 60 S.W.2d
502 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
33. In the absence of statute, an unincorporated association cannot sue in its own
name; some or all of its members must join as plaintiffs. See 35 CAF. L. Rsv. 115,
116-17 (1947). But several states have enacted statutes giving partnerships and other un-
incorporated organizations the right to sue and be sued. Id. at 117 n.17. See also Legis.,
20 ST. JoiN's L. REv. 109 (1946). Such a statute permits an association to sue for de-
famation. Kirkman v. Westchester Newspapers, Inc., 261 App. Div. 181, 24 N.Y.S.2d 860
(1st Dep't 1941).
34. Rosenberg v. J. C. Penney Co., 30 Cal. App. 2d 609, 86 P.2d 696 (1939) (by im-
plication) ; Wright v. Afro-American Co., 152 Md. 587, 137 Atl. 273 (1927) ; Vogel v.
Bushnell, 203 Mo. App. 623, 221 S.W. 819 (1920).
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for the damage inflicted upon his own interest.35 In effect, the great prepon-
derance of present-day business enterprises can sue for defamation.
Many injurious statements about a business organization are held to defame
it. Imputations that it is financially unsound, insolvent, or that it has a poor
credit rating ifll support an action.36 Charges of dishonest or unethical busi-
ness practices are defamatory, even when no crime is ascribed.37
On the other hand, statements belittling the quality of a product are rarely
considered defamatory. Courts pose the doctrinal issue as whether the state-
ment conveyed a charge that the enterprise acted dishonestly or "reprehen-
sibly" in offering the product for sale.38 For instance, some courts have found
35. Lewis v. Hayes, 177 Cal. 587, 171 Pac. 293 (1918); Wright v. Afro-American
Co., 152 Md. 587, 593, 137 AtI. 273, 275 (1927) ; Tobin v. Alfred M. Best Co., 120 App.
Div. 387, 105 N.Y. Supp. 294 (1st Dep't 1907). The death of a partner dces not extin-
guish his part of the cause of action; the surviving partners may sue jointly for the
entire injury to the firm. Rosenberg v. J. C. Penny Co., 30 Cal. App. 2d C99, 617-13, 8H
P.2d 696, 700-01 (1939).
A statement may defame both the partnership and a partner individually. In such a
case, the defamed partner must bring a separate action for his personal injury. Donaghue
v. Caffey, 53 Conn. 43, 2 At. 397 (185) ; Vogel v. Bushnell, 203 Mo. App. 623, 221 S.W.
819 (1920).
36. Brown v. Holton, 109 Ga. 431, 34 S.E. 717 (1S99) (poor credit); Simons v.
Burnham, 102 Mich. 189, 60 N.W. 476 (1S94) (heavily in debt); 'Moore & Munger Co.
v. Motor Trades Pub. Co., 170 App. Div. 779, 155 N.Y. Supp. 929 (1st Dep't 1915), aff'd,
217 N.Y. 683, 112 N.E. 1066 (1916) (bankrupt) ; Witteman Bros. v. Witteman Co., 83
Misc. 266, 151 N.Y. Supp. 813 (Sup. Ct. 1914), aff'd, 16S App. Div. 930, 152 N.Y. Supp.
1150 (2d Dep't 1915) (financially irresponsible). See Marudas v. Odegard, 215 Minm.
357, 358, 10 NAV2d 233, 234 (1943) ; McLaughlin v. F. NV. Woolworth Co., 125 Neb.
684, 637, 251 N.W. 293, 294 (1933). But merely indicating that a small business has
financial limitations is permissible. McLaughlin v. F. AV. Woolworth Co., supra.
Mercantile agencies which make a business of selling credit information are generally
not liable for erroneous statements given in good faith. See Note, Defan:ation md the
Mlercantile Agency, 2 DEPAUL L. REv. 69 (1952).
37. Vitagraph Co. of America v. Ford, 241 Fed. 6S1 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (deceptive ad-
vertising); Puget Sound Navigating Co. v. Carter, 233 Fed. 832 (W.D. Wash. 1916)
(exorbitant rates and ruthless competition) ; Rosenberg v. J. C. Penney Co., 30 Cal. App.
2d 609, 86 P.2d 696 (1939) (deceiving customers) ; Kimm v. Steketee, 48 Mich. 322, 12
N.V. 177 (1882) ("counterfeiting" labels); Tobin v. Alfred M. Best Cu., 120 App. Div.
387, 105 N.Y. Supp. 2 94 (1st Dep't 1907) (participation in scheme to sell bogus insurance) ;
Rosner v. Globe Valve Corp., 193 Misc. 351, 83 N.Y.S2d 496 (Sup. Ct. 194S), aff'd, 275
App. Div. 703, 87 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1st Dep't 1949) (tie-in sales). See Addressograph-.Multi-
graph Corp. v. American Expansion Bolt & Mfg. Co., 124 F2d 706, 703 (7th Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 316 U.S. 62 (1942) ("monopolistic" prices).
A business can also sue for defamation when a statement falsely charges that the
management condones immoral conduct in its plant. Merle v. Sociolugical Research Film
Corp., 166 App. Div. 376, 152 N.Y. Supp. 829 (1st Dep't 1915). A southern court has
held that a corporation is defamed by a statement charging that it employs a negro fore-
man to supervise white women. Axton Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Evening Post Co., 169 Ky.
64, 183 S.W. 269 (1916). But merely to say that the wordng conditions at the corpora-
tion's plant are bad is not defamatory. Ibid.
38. See Hibschman, Defamation or Disparagement?, 24 M mi. L REv. 625, 631
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defamation in statements that a company's ice cream killed one child and
poisoned others,39 or that a horse advertised for stud as an imported thorough-
bred is nothing but a "grade horse."'40 But others have held it not defamatory
to say that a caterer served a meal about which "even hungry barbarians
might justly object," 4' or that a hotel is a favorite resort of anarchists.4
Although decisions based primarily on underlying equities have made the
case law confusing, courts have displayed an obvious reluctance to infer a
defamatory charge.43 Apparently they have found defamation only when con-
vinced that the statement will have disastrous effects on the business.
44
(1940). The great majority of the cases discussing the point hold that where there is no
charge against the business itself, there is no defamation at all. E.g., Fowler v. Curtis
Pub. Co., 182 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ; Hopkins Chemical Co. v. Read Drug & Chemi-
cal Co., 124 Md. 210, 92 Atl. 478 (1914) ; Cleveland Leader Printing Co. v. Nethersole,
84 Ohio St. 118, 95 N.E. 735 (1911).
When the statement does not impute dishonesty or unethical conduct, some courts say
only that the plaintiff must prove actual damage. See, e.g., Hehmeyer v. Harper's Week-
ly Corp., 170 App. Div. 459, 461, 156 N.Y. Supp. 98, 100 (1st Dep't 1915). Standing by
itself, such a holding appears to mean that the statement is defamatory, but within that
class of libel, requiring proof of actual injury. See note 26 supra. But a statement r'e-
flecting only on the product cannot be defamatory in any way, since only a "person" can
be defamed. See ODGEs, LIBEL AND SLANDER 32 (6th ed. 1929).
39. Larsen v. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 165 App. Div. 4, 150 N.Y. Supp. 464 (2d Dep't
1914), aff'd, 214 N.Y. 713, 108 N.E. 1098 (1915); accord, Blumhardt v. Rohr, 70 Md.
328, 17 Atl. 266 (1889). It has been suggested that charges that a product is not merely
worthless but actively harmful provide the "most common" ground for finding defama-
tion in these cases. Wham, Disparagenwnt of Property, 21 ILL. L. Ray. 26, 28 (1926).
The author, however, cites only the Larsen case to support his statement. Ibid. He does
not explain cases in which such charges were held non-defamatory. E.g., Hopkins Chemi-
cal Co. v. Read Drug & Chemical Co., 124 Md. 210, 92 Atl. 478 (1914) (distinguishing
Blumhardt v. Rohr, supra) ; Dust Sprayer Mfg. Co. v. Western Fruit Grower, 126 Mo.
App. 139, 103 S.W. 566 (1907), aff'd, 277 Mo. 611 (1910).
40. Henkle v. Schaub, 94 Mich. 542, 54 N.W. 293 (1893). It has been suggested that
the criterion by which courts decide whether a statement is defamatory is whether it
implies that the seller knew of the product's defects. Wham, supra note 39, at 27. How-
ever, the statement in the Henkle case implied nothing about the plaintiff's knowledge.
The fact that no knowledge was imputed, however, has been considered in opinions
rejecting an inference of defamation. Hopkins Chemical Co. v. Read Drug & Chemical
Co., 124 Md. 210, 217, 92 Atl. 478, 481 (1914) ; Dooling v. Budget Pub. Co., 144 Mass.
258, 260, 10 N.E. 809, 811 (1887) ; cf. Evans v. Harlow, [1844] 5 Q.B. 624.
41. Dooling v. Budget Pub. Co., 144 Mass. 258, 10 N.E. 809 (1887).
42. Bosi v. New York Herald Co., 33 Misc. 622, 68 N.Y. Supp. 898 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 58 App. Div. 619, 68 N.Y. Supp. 1134 (1st Dep't 1901).
43. See Wham, supra note 39, at 27; Green, Relational Interests, 30 ILL. L. REV. 1,
36 (1935). The lengths to which a court may go to avoid finding defamation are prodi-
gious. One court held that the statement that the plaintiff's product was "something
which the experience of all practical men demonstrates [to be] a fraud" does not reflect
on the plaintiff's honesty. Nonpareil Cork Mfg. Co. v. Keasbey & Mattison Co., 108 Fed.
721 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1901).
44. A comparison of cases involving similar charges reveals that those statements
which appear to have resulted in serious damage were held defamatory, while those which
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Although a business enterprise may not gracefully fit the stereotype of the
defamed person, good reasons exist for retaining current treatment. State-
ments impugning an organization's financial status or its business methods
can undoubtedly cause real harm. Conversely, the public at large has no great
interest in having such information spread.Y Only a person such as a creditor
or supplier, who stands to lose money if the business becomes insecure, needs
such facts. And the doctrine of privilege already protects most statements
made to or by such a person.46
Holding that statements which disparage the plaintiff's product are defama-
tory if they also imply a charge of "reprehensible" conduct is justified both
conceptually and practically. Such treatment conforms to the concept that
charges of unethical business practices defame the trader. Furthermore, the
doctrine provides a convenient rationale for extreme situations in which state-
ments so cripple a business that a court feels justified in holding the de-
fendant liable without inquiring whether he acted intentionally or negligently.
Anticipation that courts might expand the doctrine to encompass all dis-
paraging statements reflects a failure to appreciate how religiously the judi-
ciary has shied away from the defamatory inference.47
The limitations of the present defamation formula, although desirable, pre-
vent it from coping with many injuries. Since consumers may care primarily
could have caused only somewhat smaller damage were not. Comnpare Larsen v. Brook-
lyn Daily Eagle, 165 App. Div. 4, 150 N.Y. Supp. 464 (2d Dep't 1914) (allegation printed
in daily newspaper that ice cream injurious), -with Hopkins Chemical Co. v. Read Drug
& Chemical Co., 124 Md. 210, 92 Adt. 478 (1914) (oral statement to one customer that
toothpaste injurious). Compare Robinson v. Coulter, 215 Mass. 5-6, 102 N.E. 938 (1913)
(charge, inter alia, that floors of school building won't support the weight of children),
with Bearce v. Bass, 88 Ale. 521, 34 AtI. 411 (M896) (mortar wurk on city hall Faid t, h.b
"of the poorest quality"). Compare Cohen v. Eisenberg, 173 Misc. 10S9, 19 ,.Y.S.2d
678 (Sup. Ct), aff'd, 260 App. Div. 1014, 24 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Ist Dept 1940) (charge
that butcher's meat not kosher, in presence of customers), with Nonpareil Cork Mfg. Co.
v. Keasbey & Mattison Co., 103 Fed. 721 (C.CE.D. Pa. 1901) (letter to third party
charging plaintiff's product a "fraud"). In other reported cases, the circumstances under
which the charge was made do not appear clearly enough to justify analysis. For an
exhaustive survey of the cases, their rationales and results, see Hibschman, mipra note 38.
45. There may be limited exceptions to this generalization. Courts may feel that a
person who contemplates immediate dealing with an enterprise has a justifiable interest
in information about business practices which directly affect the value of his purchase.
Thus a purchaser may justly want to know whether a wristwatch manufacturer makes
good on his "lifetime" guarantee. Courts can protect statements about such practices by
stretching the defamation concept of qualified privilege. See note 103 in!ra. Alternatively,
courts could make recovery more difficult by holding that such statements do not in
essence reflect on the business, but merely on the quality of its product See pp. 74-95
infra. In either case, a doctrinal distortion would be required.
46. Defamation doctrine grants a qualified privilege to a person who speaks to pro-
tect his own interests, the interests of another whom he has a legal or moral duty to
protect, or an interest held in common with the person to whom he speaks. See note 103
infra.
47. See note 43 szpra and accompanying text
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about the quality of the product they buy, or may not associate any specific
business enterprise with the product, the product's good name may often be
prized more highly than the business's own reputation for solvency or fair
dealing. And statements slurring a product may be clearly injurious without
being ruinous. Consequently, many organizations must seek relief on some
theory other than defamation.
DISPARAGEMENT OF THE QUALITY OF PRODUCTS: "TRADE LIBEL"
Where courts do not find defamation, they myopically recognize another
cause of action, which has variously been termed "trade libel,"'48 "slander of
goods,"' 49 and "disparagement of the quality of property." 0 Although the
action is frequently analogized to defamation,r1 in theory it is quite distinct. "
48. PROSSER 1037.
49. SALMOND 613-14.
50. REsTATEMENT § 626. Writers often place disparagement within the larger tort
concept of "injurious falsehood." PROSSER 1036-7; SALMOND 612-14. Injurious falsehood
embraces any non-defamatory statement, "maliciously" made, which causes actual injury.
See, generally, BowER, ACTIONABLE DEFAMATION 208-18 (2d ed. 1923). The concept in-
cludes statements reflecting on persons and on interests in real estate, as well as those
degrading products. PROSSER 1037. But there are indications that courts' attitudes vary
according to the type of statement. See note 113 infra. This Comment concerns only
those statements concerning commercial enterprises and their products. Whenever possi-
ble, footnotes will contrast treatment of trade libel with treatment given other types of
injurious falsehood.
51. Courts have often referred to disparagement as a "libel" or "slander" of the
product E.g., Bourjois, Inc. v. Park Drug Co., 82 F.2d 468, 470 (8th Cir. 1936) ; Bosi
v. New York Herald Co., 33 Misc. 622, 68 N.Y. Supp. 898 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 58 App.
Div. 619, 68 N.Y. Supp. 1134 (1st Dep't 1901). See also PRossER 1037: "Because of the
unfortunate association with 'slander,' a supposed analogy to defamation has hung over
the tort like a fog... • The plaintiff's... property seems to have been regarded as some-
how personified, and so defamed."
52. To achieve clarity, it is necessary to realize that a court may grant redress for
written statements on any of three theories. If a statement libels the plaintiff on its face,
courts normally grant recovery regardless of the defendant's intent or fault and without
requiring the plaintiff to prove actual injury. See notes 26, 27 supra and accompanying
text. If a statement libels the plaintiff, but the defamatory meaning appears only when
the plaintiff shows the surrounding circumstances, some courts require proof of actual
damage. See note 26 supra. In such a situation, the defendant's intent is still irrelevant
if he cannot assert a privilege. See note 27 supra. The disparagement action, redressing
non-defamatory statements, requires the plaintiff to prove both that he suffered actual
injury and that the defendant acted intentionally. See pp. 78-82, 90-6 infra. When
a court denies recovery on the ground that the plaintiff has not shown actual damages,
that decision does not necessarily mean that the court is invoking the disparagement
theory. See, e.g., Shaw Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Des Moines Dress Club, 215 Iowa 1130,
245 N.W. 231 (1932); Del Rico v. New Mexican, Inc., 56 N.M. 538, 246 P.2d 206
(1952); Frawley Chemical Corp. v. A. P. Larson Co., 274 App. Div. 643, 86 N.Y.S.2d
710 (1st Dep't 1949). Courts have not always made it clear which theory they are utiliz-
ing. See Comment, Trade Disparagement and the "Special Damage" Quagmire, 18 U. OF
CHI. L. Rv. 114, 120 (1950).
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Disparagement grew out of "slander of title," a common law action for injury
to real property, 5 3 and in its modem context is most reasonably considered
one form of tortious interference with business cAr
The cause of action in its present form might be stated as follows: one
who, with intent to injure another's business, makes a false assertion which
disparages the quality of the other's product is liable for pecuniary damage
directly caused thereby.5 In sharp contrast to defamation,r0 the disparage-
ment action is extremely difficult to prove.
False Assertion
Liability results only when the plaintiff proves that the defendant's state-
ment is false.5 7 Hence, the assertion complained of must be verifiable or refut-
able on the basis of objective evidence.5 s Courts will not proscribe statements
53. For a brief description of this evolution, see Bowrn, op. cit. supra note 50, at
210. The original action was named "slander" of title because during the Sixteenth Century,
when the action was first recognized, any injury to real property was a "slander." Itid.
This Comment deals with slander of title only as it relates to disparagement of prod-
ucts. For a complete exposition of the slander of title action see Smith, Distaragen:rent
of Property: I and II, 13 CoL L. REv. 13,121 (1913).
54. See PRossER 1037.
55. If a statement reflects on the competence with which an individual perfurms a
service, his cause of action is for defamation; a statement which injures him both as a
worker and as a personality gives rise only to a single cause of action, in which he can
recover for all of his damages. Guenther v. Ridgway Co., 187 App. Div. 593, 176 N.Y.
Supp. 39 (1st Dep't 1919).
56. See text at notes 25-8 supra.
57. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Martin, 5 S.V.2d 170, 173 (Te.. Civ. App.
1928) ; Western Counties Manure Co. v. Lawes Chemical 'Manure Co., [1874] L.R. 9 E:¢.
218, 23 kly. Rep. 5; see Cleveland Leader Printing Co. v. Nethersole, S4 Ohiv St. 118,
132, 95 N.E. 735, 739 (1911); Le AMassena v. Storm, 62 App. Div. 150, 154, 70 N.Y.
Supp. 882, 884 (1st Dep't 1901). See also Smith, Disaragement of Propery, 13 CoL. L
R v. 13, 16 (1913) ; Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IOWA L. RE. 175, 197 (1936). In
this respect the disparagement action differs from the defamation action, in which falsity
is presumed until the defendant proves that his statement was true. See note 23 supra
and accompanying text.
58. In more popular language, the assertion must be a statement of "fact" and not
one of "opinion." Union Car Advertising Co. v. Collier, 263 N.Y. 386, 399, 189 N.F. 463,
469 (1934), reversingq 232 App. Div. 591, 251 N.Y. Supp. 153 (1st Dep't 1931) ; Le Mas-
sena v. Storm, 62 App. Div. 150, 70 N.Y. Supp. 382 (1st Dep't 1901). See also Rc'oa.xr
OF Tim Co= =irEE ox Tim LAW OF DEFAaIAOioN 15 (London, 1948) ("Porter Commit-
tee" Report). Framing the "fact" v. "opinion' dichotomy has caused confusion in de-
famation. See 16 TF-. L. REv. 87, 88 (1937). That terminology is avoided here for the
sake of clarity.
"Objective evidence? as used here is not necessarily limited to non-testimonial evi-
dence. The plaintiff can introduce expert testimony to prove that a statement is false.
Hahn v. Duveen, 133 Alisc. 871, 234 N.Y. Supp. 185 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
The false statement does not have to be verbal Signs or pictures which are under-
stood to convey a factual assertion are actionable. E.g., Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., 243
Ala. 600, 11 So2d. 383 (1943) ; Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., 16 F2d
229 (10th Cir. 1939), reversing 24 F. Supp. 1004 (W.D. Oka. 1938).
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that one product is better than another or the best of its kind, because the
"truth" of such a proposition depends on subjective factors which vary from
person to person.5" From their standpoint such a statement is neither true
nor false.60 But if a statement is demonstrably false it is actionable, no matter
how generalized. Showing a market value disproves the assertion that a
product is worthless.61 Proving that a product meets recognized industry
standards may refute the statement that the product is of inferior quality. 2
59. Writers often assert that a competitor has an absolute privilege to say that his
product is better than a rival's, or the best of its kind. PROSSER 1048; RESTATEMENT § 649;
BowzR, ACTIONABLE DEFAMATION 211 (2d ed. 1923); Smith, Disparagement of Property
-II, 13 CoL L. REv. 121, 133-5 (1913). The case upon which the authorities principally
rely is White v. Mellin, [1895] A.C. 154. See also Hubbuck & Sons, Ltd. v. Wilkinson,
Heywood & Clark, Ltd., [1899] 1 Q.B. 86. Such a doctrine assumes that because people
expect a trader to "puff" his own goods, they are not likely to take seriously his low
opinion of his competitors' products. See RESTATEMENT § 649, comment a. This type
of reasoning appeared in White v. Mellin, supra, at 160. At least one American court
has employed the same logic. Nonpareil Cork Mfg. Co. v. Keasbey & Mattison Co., 108
Fed. 721, 723 (E.D. Pa. 1901) ; cf. Johnson v. Finance Acceptance Co. of Georgia, 118
Fla. 397, 402, 159 So. 364, 366 (1935). The premise of the argument is of doubtful
validity today, in light of the important part which advertising and sales persuasion plays
in shaping consumer reactions. See Wolff, Unfair Competition by Truthful Disparage-
ment, 47 YALE L.J. 1304, 1318 (1938).
A more lastingly valid reason given by the White court for its decision was that
granting such an action would turn courts into "machinery for advertising rival produc-
tions by obtaining a judicial determination which of the two was the better." White v.
Mellin, supra at 165. A court's adjudication that one product is better than another would
seem undesirable whether a competitor or a non-competitor has made the offending
statement. Whether an action will lie against a non-competitor for such a statement has
apparently never been adjudicated. The Restatement takes the position that a non-com-
petitor is liable if he expresses an opinion which he does not actually hold. RESTATE-
MENT §§ 627, 649. Proving that the defendant did not honestly hold the opinion he ex-
pressed may, however, present insuperable problems. Seldom will a defendant admit his
dishonesty. To prove a dishonest belief circumstantially the plaintiff might show actions
inconsistent with an honest belief. See 2 WiGIaoaz, EvmENCE § 266 (3d ed. 1940) (herein-
after cited as WIGMORE). For instance, he might prove that the defendant has purchased
the plaintiff's product in preference to all others. The plaintiff might attempt to show
that the defendant did not hold the expressed belief by proving that the belief was ex-
tremely unreasonable. See PROSSER 729. But to show that the belief was unreasonable,
the plaintiff would have to show that it was erroneous. Such a showing would require
the court or jury to decide which product is better, or whether the plaintiff's product is
the best of its kind. This is precisely the task which courts have refused to undertake.
Hence, the cause of action which the Restatement advocates can be of limited utility at
best.
60. If a generally opinionative publication contains specific misstatements of fact, an
action will lie. See Shevers Ice Cream Co. v. Polar Products Co., 194 N.Y. Supp. 44
(Sup. Ct. 1921) ; Western Counties Manure Co. v. Lawes Chemical Manure Co., [1874]
L.R. 9 Ex. 218, 23 Wkly. Rep. 5; cf. Rosenberg v. J. C. Penney Co., 30 Cal. App.2d
609, 86 P.2d 696 (1939). See also RESTATEMENT §§ 649, comment a; 626, comment a,
61. See Bliss v. Holmes, 156 Okla. 40, 9 P.2d 718 (1932).
62. See cases cited note 60 supra. None of those cases expressly held that the plain-




Words are actionable only if they belittle the quality of the plaintiff's
product. 3 The plaintiff must convince the jury that the defendant's state-
ment was understood in two ways: (1) to refer to the plaintiff's product;A
and (2) to slur its quality. 5 Many disparaging statements are explicit.co
But a statement innocent on its face may disparage the plaintiff's product by
implication. 7 The jury may infer reference to the plaintiff's product,0 s a
derogatory statement about it,69 or both.7 0 For instance, Life magazine's
erroneous claim that a portrait it published was the first ever painted of
Harry S. Truman disparaged the genuine first portrait.L7 Courts can strike
statement is false. See text at note 57 supra. There is no apparent way to prove that a
product is not of inferior quality other than showing the quality generally thought mar-
ketable in the industry. Even this may prove difficult to show, because in some industries
standards are vague and shifting. See, e.g., Comment, 61 YAI. L-. 686, 691 (1952).
63. Caron Corp. v. R. V. 0. Pictures, Inc., 28 N.Y.S2d 1020 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd,
264 App. Div. 763, 35 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1st Dep't 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 757 (1943);
BowaR, ACTIONABLE DrFmrI oN 210-11 (2d ed. 1923).
As used throughout this Comment, disparagement also embraces statements that the
plaintiff does not exist or has gone out of business. American Insurance Co. v. France,
111 Ill. App. 382 (1903); Davis v. New England Ry. Pub. Co., 203 Mass. 470, 39 N.E.
565 (1909) ; Ratcliffe v. Evans, [1892] 2 Q.B. 524. Some courts, however, consider such
a statement defamatory. E.g., Edwards X-Ray Co. V. Dental Mfg. Co., 124 Misc. S93,
210 N.Y. Supp. 299 (Sup. Ct. 1925). But cf. Dale System, Inc. v. General Teleradio, Inc.,
105 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
64. National Refining Co. v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Co., 20 F.2d 763, 767 (6th Cir.
1927); White v. Mellin, [1S95] A.C. 154, 167-8.
65. See text at note 63 supra. This parallels the theory of defamation, in which the
jury decides the meaning which the statement was understood to convey. E.g., First
National Bank of Waverly v. Winters, 225 N.Y. 47, 121 N.E. 459 (191S) ; Pnossm 791.
66. See, e.g., Erick Bowman Remedy Co. v. Jensen Salsbery Laboratories, Inc., 17
F2d 255 (8th Cir. 1926) ; Bliss v. Holmes, 156 Okla. 40, 9 P2d 718 (1932) ; MafMorries
v. Hudson Sales Corp., 233 S.V.2d 938 (Te.. Civ. App. 1950).
67. Remick Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 57 F. Supp. 475, 478 (S.D.N.Y.
1944); Lawrence Trust Co. v. Sun-American Pub. Co., 245 Mass. 262, 139 N.E. 655
(1923) (by implication). The Reinick decision denied recovery, but only because the court
felt compelled under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), to con-
form to Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 183 Misc. 645, 50 N.Y.S2d
287 (Sup. Ct 1944). The decision of the New York Supreme Court was later reversed
by the Court of Appeals. Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79,
70 N.E.2d 401 (1946), reversing 268 App. Div. 707, 53 N.Y.S2d 337 (1st Dep't 1945).
68. National Refining Co. v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Co., 20 F.2d 763, 767 (Sth Cir.
1927).
69. Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939),
reversing 24 F. Supp. 1004 (W.D. Okla. 1938).
70. Remick 'Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 57 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.N.Y.
1944) ; Davis v. New England Ry. Pub. Co., 203 Mass. 470, 89 N.E. 565 (1909).
71. Pendleton v. Time, Inc., 339 Ill App. 188, 89 N.E.2d 435 (1949), 35 Conn. LQ.
899 (1950), Comment, 18 U. OF CHL L RLv. 114 (1950).
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down obviously unfounded claims of disparagement by implication on the
ground that no reasonable man could have understood the implication to be
asserted .72 Requiring proof of intent or negligence may also block claims
based on remote implications.
73
Basis of Liability: Intent, Malice, and Negligence
Courts have habitually required evidence that the defendant was motivated
by an "intent to injure the plaintiff's business," sometimes called "actual
malice."' 74 The defendant had such an intent if he knew his statement was
false and knew that it would disparage another's product.76 Although no dis-
72. Denis v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 279 App. Div. 78, 107 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1st
Dep't 1951), aff'd, 303 N.Y. 985, 106 N.E.2d 62 (1952) (alternative holding). The Re-
statement gives the court the function of deciding whether the offending statement is
"capable of a disparaging meaning." RESTATiENT § 652. This is an application of the
rule which has long been articulated in the defamation cases. See PaOSSER 791.
73. See, e.g., Denis v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., supra note 72.
74. E.g., Dale System, Inc. v. General Teleradio, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 745, 751
(S.D.N.Y. 1952); Taggart v. Savannah Gas Co., 179 Ga. 181, 175 S.E. 491 (1934);
American Insurance Co. v. France, 111 Ill. App. 382 (1903) ; Menard v. Houle, 298
Mass. 546, 11 N.E.2d 436 (1937) ; Lawrence Trust Co. v. Sun-American Pub. Co., 245
Mass. 262, 139 N.E. 655 (1923); Union Car Advertising Co. v. Collier, 263 N.Y. 386,
189 N.E. 463 (1934), reversing 232 App. Div. 591, 251 N.Y. Supp. 153 (1st Dep't 1931) ;
Denis v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 279 App. Div. 78, 107 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Ist Dep't
1951), aff'd, 303 N.Y. 985, 106 N.E.2d 64 (1952); Stanger v. Sun Printing and Pub.
Ass'n, 181 App. Div. 245, 168 N.Y. Supp. 266 (1st Dep't 1917).
Courts have used a variety of terms to describe the necessary intent. E.g., Stanger
v. Sun Printing and Pub. Ass'n, supra ("willful intent to injure the plaintiff's business") ;
Lawrence Trust Co. v. Sun-American Pub. Co., supra ("malicious interference") ; Union
Car Advertising Co. v. Collier, supra ("sole intent to injure") ; American Life Insurance
Co. v. France, supra ("fraudulent intent"). Throughout this Comment, the phrase "in-
tent to injure" will be used to denote the intent or malice which the cases have demanded.
The same intent has not always been required in slander of title actions. See note
113 infra. But cases involving non-defamatory falsities about an individual-injurious
falsehoods-have required a showing of "malice." E.g., Raschid v. News Syndicate Co.,
265 N.Y. 1, 191 N.E. 713 (1934), vwdifying 239 App. Div. 289, 267 N.Y. Supp. 221 (1st
Dep't 1933) ; Musso v. Miller, 265 App. Div. 57, 38 N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dep't 1942) ; Balden
v. Shorter, [1933] Ch. 427.
75. "[There is no] allegation the defendants made any investigation concerning the
authenticity of the facts alleged... , or that they had any knowledge of the existence of
the plaintiffs or the [product] in question.
"[T]here could be no intentional infliction of wrongful injury to the plaintiffs.
Denis v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 279 App. Div. 78, 107 N.Y.S.2d 877, 878 (1st Dep't
1951), aff'd, 303 N.Y. 985, 106 N.E.2d 64 (1952) (alternative holding).
Several decisions expressly require only that the plaintiff prove that the defendant knew
his statement was false, but all such cases arose under circumstances in which the defen-
dant could not help but know that his statement slurred the plaintiff's product, American
Insurance Co. v. France, 111 Ill. App. 382, 385-6 (1903) ; Zenie Bros. v. Lande & Miskind,
Inc., 245 App. Div. 634, 636, 284 N.Y. Supp. 63, 66 (1st Dep't 1935), aff'd, 270 N.Y. 636,
1 N.E.2d 367 (1936); Hahn v. Duveen, 133 Misc. 871, 873-4, 234 N.Y. Supp. 185, 188
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paragement decision has expressly said so. intent may also be found-even
without a showing that the defendant knew his statement was false-if he
knew his statement would disparage and showed "active malevolence" by us-
ing extreme language in a single publication or by repeating the statement
unduly.76 Since juries can infer knowledge from surrounding circumstances,77
they may find intent when the defendant would have discovered that what
he said was false had he exercised the slightest care.78
A plaintiff may have trouble producing enough evidence of intent to avoid
a directed verdict.70 He can prove the defendant's kmowledge by introducing
the defendant's testimony concerning his own state of mind.80 But such testi-
mony would rarely be helpful. Even where knowledge cannot honestly be
disavowed, perjury and forgetfulness are tempting possibilities to defendants,
and to agents who fear that giving damaging testimony may prejudice their
jobs. Furthermore, since almost every state makes it a misdemeanor know-
(Sup. Ct. 1929) ; Shevers Ice Cream Co., Inc. v. Polar Products Co., Inc., 194 N.Y. Supp.
44, 46 (Sup. Ct. 1921) ; Mcforries v. Hudson Sales Corp., 233 S.V2d 938, 941 (Te..
Civ. App. 1950).
The number of cases which have turned on what the plaintiff must allege and prove
to show intent is so small and the holdings on the subject so fragmentary that future
courts may have little trouble distinguishing precedents away in order to arrive at new
formulae.
76. See Saxon Motor Sales, Inc. v. Torino, 166 Misc. 863, 2 N.Y.S2d 35 (Sup. Ct.
1938).
Whenever a plaintiff must prove "actual malice" in a defamation action, courts
have regularly held that intemperate language or undue repetition may indicate that
malice. Browder v. Cook, 59 F. Supp. 225, 231 (D. Idaho 1944) ; Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Jennings, 232 Ala. 438, 442, 163 So. 173, 176 (1936); Boehm v. Western
Leather Clothing Co., 161 S.W.2d 710, 71S (Mo. App. 1942); Peoples Life Insurance Co.
v. Talley, 166 Va. 464, 186 S.E. 42 (1936). A court which analogizes disparagement to
defamation might follow such precedents.
77. See, e.g., Stuart v. Hayden, 169 U.S. 1 (1S97) ; Hurricane Milling Co. v. Steel
& Payne Co., 84 IV. Va. 376, 99 S.E. 490 (1919).
78. In one case in which the plaintiff alleged only that the defendant published a
false statement "without any regard to [its truth] and without having made proper in-
quiry to ascertain the [truth]," the jury specifically found that the defendant was guilty
of "actual malice." Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Martin, 5 S.W-2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App.
1928).
79. Although actual practice varies in different jurisdictions, a court can generally
direct a verdict for the defendant-or accomplish the same result by non-suiting the plain-
tiff-when the plaintiff has failed to produce enough evidence of a fact in issue to justify
the jury in finding the e.xdstence of that fact. See James, Fusictioms of Judge a:d Jury
In Negligeace Cases, 58 YM UJ. 667, 672-5, 679-SO (1949).
80. See, e.g., In re Carson's Estate, 184 Cal. 437, 447, 194 Pac. 5, 10 (1920).
To simplify analysis, the term "defendant" is used throughout this section to denote
either an individual defendant or an agent of a defendant who has disparaged the plain-
tiff's product in the course of his employment.
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ingly to publish any false statement with the intent to sell goods thereby,8 '
some defendants, by invoking the privilege against self-incrimination,82 can
refuse to say whether they knew their statements were false and disparaging.
While a non-business defendant could not commit such an offense and could
not therefore raise the privilege, either a competitor or a non-competing busi-
ness might do so.83
The plaintiff may find a third party who will testify that the defendant or
an agent of the defendant admitted to him that the defendant knew the offend-
ing statement was false or knew it was disparaging. Courts will accept testi-
mony establishing any admission made by an individual defendant.8 4 But an
agent's admission can be introduced only if the scope of his agency included
making statements on the principal's behalf.85 A defendant could seldom be
expected to make a damaging admission and an official responsible enough
to implicate his principal would probably not be indiscreet enough to do so.
Thus evidentiary and practical limitations combine to minimize the plaintiff's
chances of introducing direct testimony to prove the defendant's knowledge.
The plaintiff might, alternatively, prove the defendant's knowledge circum-
stantially.8 6 But here again he may be unable to ferret out enough evidence
to prevent a directed verdict. Whether he can show that the defendant "must
have known" his statement would disparage depends fundamentally on wlo
the defendant is, what he said, and what kind of product he disparaged 81
81. See text at note 20 srupra.
82. The Federal Constitution and the constitutions of all but two of the states--New
Jersey and Iowa-expressly grant the privilege against self-incrimination. 8 WIGMORE
§ 2252. New Jersey guarantees the privilege by statute. Id. § 2252 n.2. Iowa courts
recognize the privilege as one of the requirements of due process of law. See 29 IoWA
L. Rzv. 373, 374 (1944). The privilege can be asserted either by a witness in or by a
party to a civil proceeding. 8 WIGcAoa §2252(a), (b). For a general description of
the privilege, see id. §§ 2250-84.
83. For an example of a case in which a non-competitor disparaged the plaintiff's
goods while attempting to sell its own product, see Advance Music Corp. v. American
Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401 (1946). There the defendant was attempting
to sell its products by broadcasting the "Hit Parade." In the course of a broadcast, the
plaintiff's popular songs were disparaged by their omission from the program.
84. See generally 4 WIGIoaE §§ 1048-87.
85. Id. § 1078. See also 36 GEO. L.J. 648 (1948).
86. If the defendant knew facts from which he "must" have concluded that his state-
ment was false and disparaging, even his express denial will not preclude the jury from
finding that he had "knowledge." See cases cited note 77 supra.
87. To find a statement disparaging, the jury must find that the recipient of the state-
ment understood it to disparage. See text at note 65 supra. Deductively, a defendant
could know his statement wvas disparaging only if he knew that the person with whom
he communicated would understand it to disparage. Thus, one who speaks about a prod-
uct to a stranger might claim that he could not know his statement would disparage
because he did not know that the recipient had enough expertise to understand the dis-
paraging nature of the statement. It seems doubtful, however, that any court would allow
a defendant to escape on such an argument. If the defendant himself understands lis
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Many statements are so clearly disparaging that the average person could
not fail to realize it. One who says, "B's insecticide does not kill fleas," must
realize from common experience that people consider ineffectual sprays in-
ferior. Other statements, however, are less clearly disparaging. If the state-
ment is that "C's ice cream is made with water," it may be impossible to
prove circumstantially that the defendant knew he was belittling the ice cream.
He may know that most ice creams contain only milk; probably he should
know that the statement was disparaging; but the plaintiff could seldom prove
that the defendant actually realized that people would scorn ice cream made
with water.8s As a third example, a defendant may have said, "D's turbine
generator delivers a maximum of 2,000 kilowatt hours per working day."
Most people would have no idea whether that constitutes good or bad per-
formance. To prove that the defendant knew such an assertion would dis-
parage, the plaintiff would have to show at least that the defendant knew
that 2,000 kilowatt hours was poor production. These examples indicate that
the plaintiff will probably get his case to the jury only when the offending
statement blatantly disparages a product the quality of which is easily deter-
mined, or when the defendant was peculiarly well-informed abuut a mure
technical product.
The plaintiff may also experience difficulty in producing circumstantial
evidence that the defendant knew his statement was fa!se.85 Proof that the
defendant had particular knowledge about products like the plaintiff's might
be introduced to demonstrate how quickly the defendant might deduce the
truth from information at his disposal. 0 But it would not show that he actually
knew anything about the plaintiff's product. Standing alone, a statement may
indicate nothing about the defendant's knowledge. But considered in the light
of the defendant's experience, the nature of the statement may be crucial.
Thus a defendant who has used a certain toothpaste for a year and still has
enamel on his teeth "knew" he was mis-speaking if he said that the toothpaste
"wears away tooth enamel in three brushings." If, however, the same defen-
statement to disparage the plaintiff's product, he knows at least that the statement is
harmful if understood. Should the plaintiff prove that the statement was in fact under-
stood, it seems unlikely that he will have to show that the defendant knew anything about
his audience.
88. An important exception to such a generalization arises when the defendant is a
competitor of the plaintiff's. Then the plaintiff might be able to show that the defendant
knew from past experience that ice cream sales fall when people realize that the product
is made with water. Anyone who has exceptional knowledge about the plaintiffs industry
or the type of product which the plaintiff produces may, of course, be scrutinized by the
jury with special care.
89. A plaintiff may prove circumstantially that the defendant knew his statement was
false, even if the defendant disclaims knowledge. See note 77 snpra.
90. "[W]hen a thing's capacity or tendency to produce an effect of a given sort is to
be evidenced by instances of the same effect attending the same thing elsewhere, these
other instances have probative value-i.e. are relevant to show such a tendency or capad-
ty..... 2 ,ViGmoRE § 442.
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dant merely said that the toothpaste "will eventually erode tooth enamel,"
nothing within his experience would necessarily demonstrate to him that the
statement was false.91 Where the defendant himself had no contact with the
plaintiff's product, the plaintiff might still be able to show the defendant's
knowledge by proving that informed sources had told the defendant the
truth.9 2 Cases in which such evidence exists, however, are probably excep-
tional.
9 3
Because the plaintiff will seldom be able to prove that the defendant knew
his statement was false and disparaging, many serious injuries may go un-
compensated. Requiring the plaintiff to prove that the defendant had actual
knowledge seems unduly restrictive.9 4  In a competitive economy, courts
should not make recovery so difficult for a business which has been injured
by disparaging statements.9 5
Contrary to the general rule, a handful of sources have authorized recovery
when the defendant negligently fails to foresee that his statement will dis-
parage.96 According to this view, anyone making a derogatory statement runs
91. Of course, the fact that the defendant used the toothpaste for a year without
becoming conscious of ill effects could be weighed by the jury along with all the other
evidence indicating that the defendant knew his statement was false.
92. To convince the jury by this means that the defendant must have concluded the
truth, the plaintiff would probably have to show that the defendant received a consider-
able number of letters from reliable sources, all or nearly all of which said the same
thing.
93. If the defendant continues to make or threatens to repeat a disparaging statement,
the plaintiff may take steps to insure that responsible parties inform the defendant of his
error. Thereafter, the defendant could be charged with knowledge. The Better Business
Bureaus typically take action of this kind. See note 6 supra. But a Bureau requires time
to make its own investigation before it acts. See note 9 supra. The plaintiff may suffer
substantial damage from continued publication before he can summon help.
94. Even if they retain the current standard of liability, courts should abandon the
"intent to injure" and "actual malice" terminology. Its use has obscured the facts which
courts require the plaintiff to prove. While the terms may be convenient short-hand ex-
pressions, liability really depends on whether the defendant knew his statement was false
and knew that it would disparage. See p. 78 supra. Courts could dispel ambiguity by
specifying what type of knowledge the defendant must have to make his conduct action-
able.
95. See, e.g., Rogers, Unfair Competition, 35 TRAD--MAmx REP. 126, 129-30 (1945).
96. Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., 106 F.2d 229, 231 (10th Cir.
1939), reversing 24 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Okla. 1938). Cf. Holmes v. Clisby, 121 Ga. 241,
48 S.E. 934 (1904) (negligent failure to foresee disparaging effect held actionable, where
court fitted statement within statutory definition of "libel"). See RESTATE ENT § 626.
See also the opinion of Baron Bramwell in Western Counties Manure Co. v. Lawes
Chemical Manure Co., [1874] L.R. 9 Ex. 218, 23 Wkly. Rep. 5, in which he held that
"maliciously" may mean only that the statement was in fact false and made "without
reasonable cause." Although no definition of reasonable cause appears, the phrase could
be interpreted to mean that a person who should have foreseen that his statement would
disparage would incur liability.
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the risk of liability if his statement is in fact falseY7 The jury's verdict Vill
depend on the same factors which determine whether a defendant "must have
known" his statement would disparage.08 The crucial difference is that this
theory orders the plaintiff to convince the jury, not that the specific defendant
knew the statement would disparage, but only that a reasonable man stand-
ing in the defendant's shoes would have known it."' A court seldom directs
a verdict for the defendant in a negligence case.100
This standard, however, goes too far in making recovery easy. In a com-
petitive economic system, it is desirable to encourage discussion of the merits
of products.101 INWell-informed consumers are better equipped to chouse the
product which best meets their needs. Concomitantly, free examination tends
to correlate an enterprise's prosperity with the social utility of its product.
False statements actively block the achievement of these goals. But if re-
covery becomes too simple, the ever-present possibility that a disparaging
statement might turn out to be false may stifle truthful discussion. Assuming
that the imposition of tort liability influences conduct, ready recovery may
suppress valuable information. Even on the premise that liability does not
affect future conduct, it seems undesirable to place so high a cost on socially
useful discussion.
A more rational rule would hold a defendant liable only when a reason-
able man would have foreseen that his statement would disparage and would
97. The Restatement expressly makes it irrelevant whether the defendant Imew his
statement was false or was negligent in that respect. REr1s=.mZmer § 62S. By failing to
mention any such requirement, the other authorities cited note 96 spra appear to concur.
No disparagement case was found which imposed liability without some showing of
fault. Disparagement suits should not be confused with slander of title cases, in which
liability is often imposed without inquiry into the defendant's culpability. See generally,
Smith, Disparagement of Property, 13 CoL L. REv. 13, 19-25 (1913).
98. See text at note 87 supra.
99. In the isolated cases which courts have decided under this theory, the plaintiff
at least got his case to the jury. See cases cited note 96 supra. Where the court requires
the plaintiff to show that the defendant had an intent to injure, on the other hand, most
plaintiffs never go to trial. See cases cited note 74 supra. Since, in negligence cases, juries
tend to favor the plaintiff, the greatest obstacle to recovery may be overcome by avoiding
a directed verdict. See James, supra note 79, at 687-8.
100. For examples of cases in which courts have sent the question of negligence to
the jury despite a paucity of plaintiff's evidence, see James, Proof of the Breach it Negli-
gence Cases, 37 VA. L. REV. 179, 184, 189 (1951). The cases there cited were actions
for personal injuries. Ibid. Feelings of sympathy may make a court more reluctant to
non-suit a plaintiff who has suffered physical harm than to deny a verdict to one on whom
disparagement has inflicted purely financial damage.
101. "Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation,
must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the
members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period." Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940). The need for free discussion of products is emphasized by the
extent to which consumers must rely on second-hand information in choosing one of the
numerous products usually available to them in the competitive economy. See text at
note 1 supra.
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have ascertained that the statement was false. Since the plaintiff would still
have to prove only what the defendant should have known, recovery would
be a practical possibility. On the other hand, freeing the defendant from lia-
bility unless he was negligent in failing to realize that his statement was
false gives discussion sufficient lattitude. Intelligent commentary would be
preserved; anyone who had good reason to believe his statement was true
would escape liability. Only irresponsible statements, of relatively little social
value, would be grounds for suit.
Whether a reasonable man would have foreseen that his statement would
disparage depends on factors previously discussed ;102 whether the defendant
should have ascertained that his statement was false turns on both the method
and extent of his investigation. The defendant may be liable, in the first place,
because he picked an unreasonable means of informing himself.Y° 3 The jury
may decide that a defendant who has spoken solely in reliance on statements
of others should have conducted his own research. Or it may find that a
defendant who has relied entirely upon personal investigation should have
sought the counsel of others better informed.
Assuming that the jury considers the defendant's method reasonable, it
must then decide whether the defendant pursued the method to a satisfactory
extent and in a careful manner. A personal investigation must probe deeply
enough to satisfy a reasonable man that the statement is true. Dependence
on the statements of others is satisfactory only if a reasonable man would
have considered the defendant's sources reliable. When the defendant has
relied in part on another's statement and has in addition made his own check,
liability will result only when his investigation and his reliance on the state-
ment's source, taken together, were not grounds for a reasonable belief that
the statement was true.
The negligence standard is flexible. The reasonableness both of the defen-
dant's chosen method of inquiry and his diligence in investigating depend on
the extent of the damage which his statement would foreseeably cause, the
cost of inquiring, and the defendant's opportunity to do so.1 ' A competing
corporation blessed with extensive research facilities and a plush budget could
be expected to take more care than an individual consumer. Similarly, broad-
casting a disparagement to a nation-wide audience calls for greater precaution
than chatting with a friend over the tea cups.
102. See pp. 80-1 supra.
103. In some instances, of course, the defendant may have done no active research,
but merely relied on information which he received unsolicited. Without specifying the
means by which such a defendant should have investigated, a jury could find him negli-
gent in not making some inquiry.
104. A person is negligent only when he acts under circumstances which would have
led a reasonable man to foresee that there was an unreasonable risk that his conduct
would cause harm. PROSSER 220-3. Hence, estimable damage and the cost of and oppor-




In defamation, "absolute" privilege immunizes any statement made with
the plaintiff's consent,10 or in a governmental proceeding,10 0 or by one spouse
to the other ;1o7 "qualified" or "conditional" privilege protects statements made
"Nithout malice" when the speaker had a legal or moral duty to speak.10 3
Writers maintain that the defamation forms of privilege also pertain to dis-
paragement.10 9 This is accurate concerning absolute immunity,""0 but mis-
leading in regard to qualified privilege. Few disparagement cases have dis-
cussed qualified privilege, and none of them has demanded more than prouf
of malice-or intent to injure-to overcome that defense 11  From this fact
105. PRossm 830; R.STATMENT § 583.
106. A person who makes a defamatory statement in the course of any judicial pro-
ceeding is immune, be he judge, grand or petit juror, witness, party, or attorney. Pros-
sEa 823-4. The immunity extends, however, only to those statements relevant to the pro-
ceeding. Id. at 825.
A member of Congress or a state legislator is immune from suit for any statement
he makes in the performance of his duties. RESTATEENT § 590. Witnesses in legislative
hearings have the same privilege. PRossER 82S. The president and the state governors
are privileged with respect to statements made in the course of their duties. 1 Coo= -v,
Toars 534 (4th ed. 1932). But there are conflicting decisivns concerning the immunity
of lesser executive officers. See PRossmt 8L9; REsTAT1ENT § 591, caz'cat.
107. PRossER 831; RESTA ENT § 592. This immunity prohibits any suit based on
a statement made by one spouse to the other. It should not be confused with each spouse's
privilege not to testify against the other. See S WIGMl'RE §§ -227-45.
108. See 1 Coo=.z, ToRTs 539 (4th ed. 1932).
Qualified privilege takes many forms. A person may make a statement reasonably
necessary to protect his own reputation or property interests. Pnossra SZ2-3. He may
also make statements necessary to protect the interest of another, when he has a legal or
moral duty to protect. Rr-STATEMENT § 595. A person interested in a specified subject
matter may speak about it to another person interested in it. RESTATE T § 596; Green,
Relational Interests, 30 ILL L. R,.. 1, 34 (1935). Statements of fact made about public
officers or to public authorities are granted the qualified privilege. Prossmt 83941. Any
expression of opinion on a matter of public interest is privileged. Id. at 8414. And reports
of legislative or judicial proceedings are awarded the privilege. Id. at 844-6.
The privilege is termed "qualified" because it is lost if the defamatory statement is not
made in a reasonable manner and for a proper purpose. Id. at 846-7. In order to over-
come the defense of qualified privilege, the plaintiff must show that the defendant was
motivated by "actual malice." See BowEmR, Acrio-Am.z Dr M.TrION 132 (2d ed. 1923).
109. E.g., PRossER 1045; REsTATEmENT §§ 635-46, 650; Note, The Prilcge to Dis-
parage a Non-Competing Business, 30 CoL. L. REv. 510, 511 (1930).
110. No cases have been reported in which a disparagement action was barred by
an absolute privilege. But the Restatement applies the defamation categories to disparage-
ment. RESTAT ENT §§ 63542. And absolute privilege has barred recovery in slander
of title cases. E.g., Davis v. Union State Bank, 137 Kan. 264, 20 P.2d 503 (1933);
Maginn v. Schmick, 127 1o. App. 411, 105 S.W. 666 (1907); Buehrer v. Provident
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 123 Ohio St. 264, 175 N.E. 25 (1931).
111. S-an v. Tappan, 59 Mlass. 104 (1849); Witteman Bros. v. Witteman Co., 8S
fisc. 266, 151 N.Y. Supp. 813 (Sup. Ct. 1914), aff'd, 152 N.Y. Supp. 1150 (24 Dep't
1915); Cleveland Leader Printing Co. v. Nethersole, 84 Ohio St. 118, 95 N.E 735
(1911) ; Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Martin, 5 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
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commentators have concluded that courts do not inquire into the defendant's
culpability, except when he asserts a privilege. 1 2 But their deductions do not
comprehend more recent decisions requiring an intent to injure even in the
absence of privileged circumstances." 3 Disparagement cases denying liability
while talking about privilege indicate that courts actually barred recovery
because they could find no intent to injure, and that discussion of qualified
privilege merely represents judicial groping for a rationale."
4
It has been suggested further that forms of privilege justifying other
methods of interference with business apply as well to disparagement. 11 Apt
as the analogy may seem," 6 analysis discredits such a sweeping inference,
Courts generally immunize economic interference on either of two grounds.
A person is privileged to interfere when his action is reasonably necessary
to preserve his own property interests, or those of his principal. 11 And bar-
ring intentional interference with existing contracts,1 8 competitors are privi-
112. PROSSER 1043; Smith, Disparagement of Property-Il, 13 COL. L. Ray. 121, 137-
42 (1913).
113. Dale System, Inc. v. General Teleradio, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 745, 751 (S.D.N.Y.
1952) ; Taggart v. Savannah Gas Co., 179 Ga. 181, 175 S.E. 491 (1934) ; Denis v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 279 App. Div. 78, 107 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1st Dep't 1951), aff'd, 303
N.Y. 985, 106 N.E.2d 64 (1952); McMorries v. Hudson Sales Corp., 233 S.W.2d 938
(Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
In slander of title cases, a statement made without an intent to injure is generally
actionable. Where a rival claimant to the title asserts his claim in good faith, however,
he is protected by a privilege. Smith, Disparagement of Property, 13 COL. L. Rv. 13,
17-33 (1913). Both Prosser and Smith treat slander of title and disparagement as two
phases of the same cause of action. PRossER 1036-48; Smith, Disparagement of Property:
I and II, 13 COL. L. REv. 13, 121 (1913) passin. Since the cases indicate that an intent to
injure must be proved in all disparagement actions, the analogy to slander of title should
be abandoned.
114. See cases cited note 111 supra. Here again, confusion may have resulted from
a failure to distinguish between libel actions and disparagement suits. See note 52 supra.
Some cases which are cited as recognizing qualified privilege in disparagement were
actually treated by the courts as defamation actions, although special damages were
shown. Browning v. Van Rensselaer, 97 Fed. 531 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1899) ; Inland Printer
Co. v. Economical Half Tone Supply Co., 99 Ill. App. 8 (1901); Adolf Philipp Co. v.
New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, 165 App. Div. 377, 150 N.Y. Supp. 1044 (1st Dep't 1914):
Youngquist v. American Railway Express Co., 49 S.D. 373, 206 N.W. 576 (1926).
115. PRossER 1045.
116. False statements are, in effect, only one of several methods by which tortious
injury can be inflicted on a business. See Green, Relational Interests, 30 ILL. L. Rav. 1
(1935) ; Note, 56 YALE L.J. 885 (1947).
117. E.g., Western Electric Co. v. Hammond, 135 F.2d 283, 285 (1st Cir. 1943). See
PRossER 1019-20. Disinterested protection of third persons or of the public interest may
also be grounds for immunity. Ibid.
118. Intentionally inducing a person to breach a contract with the plaintiff is tortious.
See Carpenter, Interference With Contract Relations, 41 HARV. L. REy. 728 (1928);
Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IowA L. REv. 175, 209-12 (1936).
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leged to interfere with each other in seeking economic gain.119 In disparage-
ment, courts will undoubtedly excuse statements reasonably made in defense
of one's property rights.120 The immunity may extend to statements vindicat-
ing the quality of one's own products.' 21 But no privilege is recognized for
competition; a business is not justified in slurring rival goods to make
sales'- 22
In a court which imposes liability when the defendant was negligent only L'
qualified privilege may be meaningful. Establishing it bars liability for negli-
gence and requires proof of an intent to injure.- 4 Should courts impose lia-
bility only when the defendant negligently failed to ascertain that his state-
ment was both false and disparaging, however, applying the doctrine of quali-
fied privilege to disparagement seems ill-advised. A duty to speak renders
reasonable conduct which would otherwise be unreasonable. The jury must
then decide whether the conduct of a reasonable man under the same duty
would have differed from the defendant's.'-5 The negligence norm does
everything that qualified privilege would do except absolve a defendant totally
ignorant of the facts.-2 6 Even when he has a duty to speak, the defendant
119. E.g., George F. Hewson Co. v. Hopper, 130 N.J.L. 525, 33 A.2d 839 (1943);
PRossER 1020-9. Competitors are, however, never justified in interfering by methods
which courts consider "unfair." For a general discussion of fair and unfair methods of
competition, see Xnxs, UNFAm Comp rIxox AD TRwuEmsARns (4th ed. 1947).
120. This result would follow from application of the defamation concept of qualified
privilege, regardless of courts' acceptance of the analogy to economic interference. See
note 108 supra.
121. Cf. Boynton v. Shaw Stocking Co., 146 Mass. 219, 15 N.E. 507 (1223) (libel
action defeated where defendant sought to vindicate own goods).
122. See Green, supra note 116, at 36-7; Handier, mpra note 118, at 193; Smith,
Disparagement of Property-Il, 13 Col- L. Rsv. 121, 141 (1913). Disparagement certain-
ly qualifies as an unfair method of competition. See 2 Nrxs, op. cit. supra note 119, at
828-9.
123. See te-xt at notes 96-7 supra.
124. See note 103 supra.
125. One who has no duty to speak must hold his peace until he can make a thorough
investigation. When a person has a duty to speak, however, the element of lime may
become crucial. For instance, one who knows that his daughter plans to spend her entire
savings on an automobile before the day is out might speak on the basis of fragmentary
information, because his "moral duty" to protect his daughter requires him to speak
before she squanders. He does not have tlme to make as thorough an inquiry as he might
otherwise. This does not relieve him from the necessity of exercising reasonable care,
but the jury must judge his conduct by what a reasonable man would have done under
the same circuimstances. PROSSER 226.
126. The qualified privilege of "fair comment" bars liability for a "fair and reason-
able" expression of opinion on a matter of public interest. See note 103 supra. Intro-
ducing a negligence standard would not affect the application of this privilege to dis-
paragement. Disparaging statements of opinion are actionable in any case only if the
defendant is not a competitor of the plaintiff's and does not believe what he says. See
note 59 supra. For most practical purposes, a statement of opinion vll not support a
disparagement action at all. Ibid.
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should be required to make some inquiry before he makes a disparaging state-
ment.127
Direct Causation
Disparagement is actionable only if it directly causes compensable injury.' "8
The jury decides whether the disparagement in fact caused the injury com-
plained of, and the court decides whether the causation was direct enough to
justify imposing liability.12 9 Directness becomes crucial only when a third
party republishes the disparaging statement. 130 The defendant may be held
responsible only for injury inflicted through intended or authorized repeti-
tion.131.
Assuming the injury is sufficiently direct, the plaintiff must still convince
the jury that the disparagement in fact caused the harm.1 2 He can introduce
direct testimony concerning the reasons for identifiable refusals to trade,1 9
Even when those who have refused are unavailable as witnesses, the plaintiff's
representatives can testify to reasons given them for such refusals.1 3 4 When
127. A person whose interests may suffer when another person buys an inferior prod-
uct would not be required to keep absolutely silent, even if he were totally ignorant of
the facts. He could urge the buyer to refrain from purchasing until the buyer knew more
about the product or until he had considered the purchase more carefully. He could even
insist that the product was not the best of its kind, or that another product was superior,
without incurring liability. See pp. 75-6 supra.
128. American Insurance Co. v. France, 111 I1l. App. 382 (1903); Bosi v. New
York Herald Co., 33 Misc. 622, 68 N.Y. Supp. 898 (Sup.. Ct.), aff'd, 58 App, Div.
619, 68 N.Y. Supp. 1134 (lst Dep't 1901); Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Martin, 5
S.W.2d 170, 175 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
129. See RESTATEMENT § 652(1) (d), (2) (e).
130. No reported case intimates that the defendant would escape liability for any part
of the loss due to his statement alone. However, courts have denied recovery for injury
to good will. See text at note 147 infra. In a sense, it could be said that the reason for
this is that the injury is not "directly" caused, since its impact will not fall on the plain-
tiff until some future time.
131. In one case, the court allowed the defendant to introduce evidence of an un-
intended repetition, in order to mitigate damages. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Martin,
5 S.W.2d 170, 174-5 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
The Restatement makes the defendant liable for damage caused by repetition if: (1)
he should have foreseen repetition; (2) he intended or authorized it; or (3) the person
repeating the statement was privileged to do so. RESTATEMENT § 631.
132. Union Car Advertising Co. v. Collier, 263 N.Y. 386, 400, 189 N.E. 463, 469-70
(1934), reversing 232 App. Div. 591, 251 N.Y. Supp. 153 (1st Dep't 1931); Schaff-
hauser Bros. v. Hemmer, 152 Iowa 200, 131 N.W. 6 (1911). See REsTAT=ENT § 652
(2) (e).
133. One who has refused to trade can, of course, testify to why he did so. Swartz
v. Kay, 89 W. Va. 641, 109 S.E. 822 (1921).
134. Landstrom v. Thorpe, 189 F.2d 46, 53-4 (8th Cir. 1951) ; Swartz v. Kay, 89 W.
Va. 641, 109 S.E. 822 (1921). Testimony proving a third party's declaration of his rea-
sons for action, made when he acts, are generally admissible, so long as that mental con-
dition is relevant to the issue in dispute. 6 WIGMORE § 1729(2).
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direct testimony is lacking, a few courts have permitted a causal inference on
a showing that the injury was the "natural and probable" result of the dis-
paragement. 13 5 For instance, one court held that omitting a popular song
from the "Hit Parade" might naturally cause a decrease in sheet music
sales.1
30
In proving direct causation, the plaintiff might get his case to the jury
simply by indicating the seriousness of the disparagement, the number of
people it reached, and any known reactions to it.137 But most courts, recog-
nizing that factors other than the disparagement may have caused the plain-
tiff's loss, would probably direct a defendant's verdict if this type of evidence
alone were offered. The plaintiff's loss may have resulted from a normal
decline in demand for his product. There may have been a general business
recession in the plaintiff's marketing area or in his industry as a whole.
In theory, the plaintiff must prove only that the disparagement played a
"material and substantial" part in persuading others not to deal with him.133
Where he can produce testimony concerning the reasons given by customers
for specific refusals to trade, he may sustain his burden of proof by showing
merely that the disparagement was one major factor dissuading each customer
from buying.135 But where the plaintiff must use circumstantial evidence to
convince the jury that the disparagement caused his loss of trade, he vill
actually have to prove that normal business factors did not cause the injury.
That task may be formidable. If the defendant, for example, has disparaged
a nationally marketed product in a nationally distributed publication, the plain-
tiff's sales may decline uniformly throughout the country. Then the plaintiff
will probably be unable to prove that normal business factors did not cause
his loss, since a nation-wide enterprise responds to a horde of economic vari-
135. Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 45 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1930) ; Erich Bovwman
Remedy Co. v. Jensen Salsbery Laboratories, Inc., 17 F.2d 255, 261 (8th Cir. 1926).
136. Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E2d 401
(1946), reversing 268 App. Div. 707, 53 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1st Dep't 1945). The case did
not do away with the necessity of showing actual damages. Blens Chemicals, Inc. v.
WVyandotte Chemical Corp., 197 Misc. 1066, 96 N.Y.S.2d 47 (Sup. Ct. 1950). And it has
not been followed where the plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to warrant an infer-
ence that the disparagement caused the damage complained of. Eversharp, Inc. v. Pal
Blade Co., 182 F.2d 779, 781 (2d Cir. 1950).
137. See Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 45 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1930).
138. See ProssER 324.
139. The "material and substantial" theory would not, however, allow the jury to
infer that the plaintiff had suffered losses beyond those which he proves. Courts have
required explicit evidence of the extent of the plaintiff's damage. See pp. 90-3 infra.
If the plaintiff, for example, proves only that 40 customers refused to buy because of the
disparagement, the jury may not infer that he lost 100.
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ants.140 If, however, the defendant has talked down a national product in one
area only, the plaintiff may succeed by showing that his business declined in
that area while his sales remained stable elsewhere. 141 If the plaintiff markets
only in the area in which the disparagement was circulated, he can succeed
only by proving that similar businesses within the area prospered while his
slumped. 142 Courts should use discretion to assure that the plaintiff does not
confuse the jury with irrelevant evidence. Since economic conditions may
vary from region to region, the jury should hear only that evidence which
relates to the area-in some cases the neighborhood-in which the plaintiff
markets his product. It may also be wise to prevent the plaintiff from show-
ing sales conditions in industries other than his own. A constant demand for
milk indicates nothing about the market for mink.
Damages
Quick as they are to award damages for defamation, 14 3 courts have culti-
vated rigorous standards of compensation for disparagement. 144 No damages
are presumed. 145 Even when the plaintiff can show actual injury, he will not
recover if he shows only "non-pecuniary" harm, such as mental suffering or
deterioration of business prestige. 146 In addition, the pecuniary value of good
140. If some party has previously disparaged the plaintiff's product in much the same
manner which the present defendant has employed, the plaintiff may convince the jury
that the defendant's disparagement caused his loss by showing that his sales fell follow-
ing both disparagements.
141. To recover in this manner, the plaintiff would probably have to show that over-
all sales levels in the area covered by the disparagement were stable. Otherwise, his loss
of sales in that area might have resulted from a local decline in market conditions for all
products.
142. Even then he is not assured of success, since a jury might find that his sales
dropped because of a normal decline in the demand for his product.
143. See text at notes 26-9 supra.
144. Most disparagement cases never get to trial; almost all the cases reported con-
cern demurrers or motions to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. Recovery for
disparagement is almost unknown. See Handler, supra note 118, at 199 (1936). Hence,
any conclusions as to what future courts will accept as proof of damage must be some-
what tentative.
145. At least this much is indicated by the numerous cases which require the plain-
tiff to show "special" damages. E.g., Dale System, Inc. v. General Teleradio, Inc., 105
F. Supp. 745, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) ; Fowler v. Curtis Pub. Co., 182 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir.
1950) ; Blens Chemicals, Inc. v. Wyandotte Chemical Corp., 197 Misc. 1066, 96 N.Y.S.2d
47 (Sup. Ct. 1950). But see Edwin L. Wiegand Co. v. Harold E. Trent Co., 122 F.2d
920, 924 (3d Cir. 1941).
Use of the terms "general" and "special" damage obscures the basic problems of what
the plaintiff must show. The English courts have consciously steered away from the term
"special damages" because of its uncertain meaning. See, e.g., Ratcliffe v. Evans, [1892]
2 Q.B. 524, 528-9.
146. Fowler v. Curtis Pub. Co., 182 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Eversharp, Inc. v.
Pal Blade Co., 182 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1950). See RESTATENT § 633, comment /s;
PRossEa 1043. But cf. Pendleton v. Time, Inc., 339 Ill. App. 188, 89 N.E.2d 435 (1949).
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will-the prospect of future sales-is considered too speculative to support
recovery.1
47
Damages will be awarded, however, for clear pecuniary losses. The plain-
tiff may be reimbursed for expenses incurred in a reasonable effort to vin-
dicate the quality of the disparaged product.148 Furthermore, he can recover
for loss due to injury to the product's present marketability.14 9 When the
product is a unique item, decrease in its market value is recoverable. 1-' In
the more usual commercial situation, where the product is available in num-
bers and sold at a fixed price, compensable injury is shown by evidence of
lost sales.Y'1 In any case, the plaintiff can recover only those damages suffered
before the trial, since he must prove actual injury.
1 -52
Courts have frequently had to decide what evidence is sufficient to show
the extent of lost sales. They hold universally that proof of specific refusals
to buy on the part of named customers is adequate.'5 3 A few jurisdictions
allow recovery for specific refusals even when the customers are not identi-
fied.' -  Many courts, apparently worried lest the plaintiff fabricate evidence
which the defendant could not rebut, adamantly refuse to go this far.15 Only
147. Fowler v. Curtis Pub. Co., 182 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Trachtenberg Bros.
v. Henrietta Stein, Inc., 64 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. 1946). The Restatcmcnt limits re-
covery to "that pecuniary loss which directly and immediately results frvm the impair-
ment of the vendibility of the thing in question. . . ." RESTAT-,MT § 633 (emphasis
added). This formula would seem to exclude recovery for any injury done to the plain-
tiff's prospects of future sales.
148. See Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 45 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1930). At
least one court has allowed such damages in an action for defamation of a business. Den
Norske Americkalinje Actiesselskabet v. Sun Printing and Pub. Ass'n, 226 N.Y. 1, 122
N.E. 463 (1919). The methods which the plaintiff employs to protect his product must
be reasonable. Id. at 8, 122 N.E. at 465. The Restatement expressly denies recovery of
expenses incurred in vindication. RSTATEmENTr § 633, comment i.
149. REsTATEENT §§ 626, 633.
150. Pendleton v. Time, Inc., 339 Ill. App. 133, 89 N.E.d 435 (1949); Kennedy
Construction Co. v. Press Co., 199 Misc. 370, 106 N.Y.S2d 8 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Houston
Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Martin, 5 S.XV.2d 170, 174 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). Conlra: Vil-
son v. Dubois, 35 Minn. 471, 29 N.V. 68 (1886).
151. See, e.g., Landstrom v. Thorpe, 139 F.2d 46 (Sth Cir. 1951); Erick Bowman
Remedy Co. v. Jensen Salsbery Laboratories, Inc., 17 F.2d 255, 261 (Sth Cir. 1926);
WkVright v. Coules, 4 Cal. App. 343, 87 Pac. 809 (1906) ; Comment, Trade Dispragcmx:t
and the "Special Damage" Quagmire, 18 U. OF Cm. L. Rxv. 114, 116 (190).
152. See text at note 145 supra.
153. See, e.g., Landstrom v. Thorpe, 189 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1951); Eversharp, Inc. v.
Pal Blade Co., 182 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1950); RESTATEMENT § 633, comment b. Fur a
compilation of the cases, see Comment, 13 U. OF CHL L. Rm,. 114, 116 n.15 (1950).
154. Wright v. Coules, 4 Cal. App. 343, 87 Pac. 809 (1906); Pendleton v. Time,
Inc., 339 Ill. App. 188, 89 N.E.2d 435 (1949). Some courts have held that the plaintiff
in a defamation action, in order to collect "special" damages, does not have to name the
persons who refused to buy. Godin Y. Niebuhr, 236 Mass. 330, 128 N.E. 40G (1920);
Kimm v. Steketee, 48 Mich. 322, 12 N.V. 177 (1882).
155. E.g., Landstrom v. Thorpe, 189 F2d 46, 56 (Sth Cir. 1951) ; Wilson v. Dubois,
35 Minm 471, 29 N.W. 63 (1886); Del Rico Co. v. New Mexican, Inc., 36 N.M. 533, 551,
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the most lenient allow the jury to infer the loss of unknown customers from
a general decline in the plaintiff's business. 150 Even then the plaintiff must
generally show that the size and anonymity of his clientele prevent him from
specifying refusals to buy.157 Where acceptable, general loss of business is
indicated by showing sales for a substantial period before the disparagement
and a decrease in sales following it.158 Evidence that the plaintiff's sales would
have increased over previous levels except for the disparagement is deemed
too speculative to merit consideration. 150
Paradoxically, disparagement decisions refuse to impose liability for
breaches of consummated sales contracts on the ground that the plaintiff has
an adequate remedy against the breaching party.160 But many jurisdictions
246 P.2d 206, 214-15 (1952). See also Comment, Trade Disparagement and the "Special
Damage" Quagmire, 18 U. OF Cm. L. Ray. 114, 116 (1950) ; Handler, Unfair Coolpeli-
tlion, 21 IOWA L. REV. 175, 198 (1936) ; PROSSER 1044-5.
Some courts have also required the plaintiff to name persons who refuse to trade
when the plaintiff attempts to recover "special" damages in a defamation action. Shaw
Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Des Moines Dress Club, 215 Iowa 1130, 245 N.W. 231 (1932);
Rensch v. Roanoke Cold Storage Co., 91 Va. 534, 22 S.E. 358 (1895).
156. The English courts have long held that a general decline in business will sup-
port recovery. Ratcliffe v. Evans, [1892] 2 Q.B. 524. Only two courts in the United
States have held squarely that the plaintiff can recover by showing a general decline in
business. Erick Bowman Remedy Co. v. Jensen Salsbery Laboratories, Inc., 17 F.2d 255
(8th Cir. 1926); Dale System, Inc. v. Willmark Service Co., -F. Supp.- (D. Conn.
1953); cf. Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 45 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1930). Two
cases have denied motions to dismiss, although the plaintiff did not allege specific refusals
to buy. Pendleton v. Time, Inc., 339 Ill. App. 188, 89 N.E.2d 435 (1949) ; Advance
Music Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401 (1946). Neither of
them, however, indicates what evidence the plaintiff would be required to produce at trial.
Another case granted a motion to dismiss when the plaintiff pleaded a general loss of
sales, but the opinion indicated that the court's real objection was that the plaintiff had
not alleged facts showing that the loss was caused by the disparagement. Eversharp, Inc.
v. Pal Blade Co., 182 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1950). The Restatement allows recovery for a
general loss of sales. REsTATMENT § 633, comment f; id. illustration 1. But it is
generally held that showing a general decline in business will not support an action, See
cases cited note 155 supra. See also PROSSER 1044-5; Handler, supra note 155, at 198.
157. Eversharp, Inc. v. Pal Blade Co., 182 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1950); Erick Bowman
Remedy Co. v. Jensen Salsbery Laboratories, Inc., 17 F.2d 255, 261 (8th Cir. 1926);
Ratcliffe v. Evans, [1892] 2 Q.B. 524, 532; ef. Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell Law
Dictionary, Inc., 68 N.D. 425, 280 N.W. 879 (1938).
158. Erick Bowman Remedy Co. v. Jensen Salsbery Laboratories, Inc., 17 F.2d 255,
261 (8th Cir. 1926); REsTATEMENT § 633, comment f. For a striking example of an
alternative method by which a plaintiff might prove his loss of sales, see Landstrom v.
Thorpe, 189 F.2d 46, 54-5 (8th Cir. 1951). There the plaintiff showed that his sales to
customers who had -not received the disparaging communication remained constant, while
sales to those who had received it decreased markedly.
159. Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 45 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1930). The Re-
statement also would permit recovery only when the plaintiff's sales have "fallen off."
RESTATEMENT § 633, comment f.
160. E.g., Witteman Bros. v. Witteman Co., 88 Misc. 266, 151 N.Y. Supp. 813 (Sup.
Ct. 1914), aff'd, 152 N.Y. Supp. 1150 (2d Dep't 1915). The same result has been reached
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entertain damage actions for inducing breach of contract through misrepre-
sentation and defamation.1 " Courts may be willing to extend that treatment
to disparaging statements. 1 2 When the plaintiff wants to recover in a single
suit for both breaches and refusals to contract, his success will depend on
procedural rules concerning joinder of actions 10 3 and on the court's willing-
ness to allow him to "circumvent" the limitations of the disparagement action.
Restrictive conceptions of compensable damage have constituted the major
obstacle to recovery for disparagement.' 1" Limiting evidence of lost sales to
testimony showing specific refusals to trade by identified persons may deprive
the modern-day plaintiff of his only means of proving real damage.1 5 Persons
whose identities remain unknownm may expressly refuse to buy, and their
anonymity in no way diminishes the resultant injury.IcG In such a case the
only testimony usually available will be that given by the plaintiff or his
employees.'0 7 But even then the plaintiff is not assured of success, because
in defamation cases. Reporters' Ass'n of America v. Sun Printing and Pub. Co., 15
N.Y. 437, 79 N.E. 710 (1906). Several slander of title cases have barred recovery on
this ground. See compilation in 33 CoL L. REV. 90, 92 n.25 (1933). See also Prxossm
1044. The Restatenwnt would allow recovery against a disparagcr for brcaches of con-
tract caused by his disparagement. R5sTAT-zmENT § 633, comment 1.
161. E.g., Canellos v. Zotalis, 145 Alinn. 292, 177 N.W. 133 (1920); Stebbins v.
Edwards, 101 Okla. 188, 224 Pac. 714 (1924); 'Max v. Kahn, 91 N.J.L. 170, 102 At. 737
(1917); Chambers v. Probst, 145 Ky. 3M1, 140 S.V. 572 (1911); American Law Bo!:
Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 41 Misc. 396, 84 N.Y. Supp. 225 (Sup. Ct. 1903). For a
general discussion of the cause of action for inducing breach of contract, see Pr.ossm
976-1013; Harper, Interference with Contrachtal Relations, 47 Nw. U.L Rnv. 873 (1953).
162. The inconsistency of denying recovery against a disparager for breaches of con-
tract caused by his disparagement is discussed in 33 CoL. L. REv. 9D (1933).
163. Federal procedure authorizes the joinder of any claims the plaintiff has against
the defendant. FmD. R. Crv. P. 18(a). Some states have rules of joinder substantially the
same as the federal rule. See CLARK, CODE PM.v xZG 443 (2d ed. 1947). Many states
allow joinder of two claims when they both involve injury to property; others allow
joinder of claims "arising out of the same transaction." Id. at 441. In such states, the
plaintiff should have no difficultv in joining an action for disparagement with one for
interference with contract.
164. See Handler, supra note 155, at 198; Note, 41 ILL. L. rEv. 661, 663 (1947).
165. This restriction arose at a time when trading organizations were small and the
trader, who knew his customers personally, could bring them into court to prove that they
had refused to trade because of the disparagement. The absurdity of applying a stand-
ard which developed in circumstances so unlike those of modem business has been pointed
out Ibid.
166. See id. at 663-4.
167. 'Manufacturers, of course, often sell their products to the cunsuming public
through independent retailers. If the plaintiff is the manufacturer of the product, testi-
mony may come from retail sales personnel not directly employed by the plaintiff.
1953]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
such uncorroborated testimony may not sustain his burden of persuading the
trier of fact that there was actual damage. 168 Since the law considers juries
competent to judge the credibility of witnesses, 169 the fact that the defendant
will be unable to produce evidence refuting the claim of injury should not
make the plaintiff's cause of action defective as a matter of law.
There is also no justification for a court's refusal to consider as evidence
of lost sales a plaintiff's showing of a general decline in his business. 170 The
inequity of disallowing damages thus proved may be great, since any business
which relies on responses to general advertising, rather than on personal
solicitation of customers, cannot show specific refusals to trade. 171 General loss
of business would be indicated by analysis of the plaintiff's business records.172
Pre-trial discovery procedures make such documents available to the defen-
dant,1 7 3 and he could give the jury his own interpretation of their content.
Both common law and statutory enactment have recognized the reliability of
business entries. 174 In sum, the chances that the plaintiff could succeed in
fabricating a loss of trade are minimal.
Denying recovery for injury to good will may leave a genuine loss uncom-
pensated. Even if a generous statute of limitations would permit the plaintiff
to defer suit until substantially all losses caused by the disparagement have
168. See text at note 132 szpra.
The fact that a witness is currently or has been previously employed by the party for
whom he testifies is an established ground for impeaching his testimony. See annotation
in 3 WIGMORE § 949 n.4.
169. E.g., Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891) ; Rodgers v.
Blandon, 294 Mich. 699, 707, 294 N.W. 71, 74 (1940).
170. Most courts refuse to accept this evidence. See text at notes 155-6 supra.
Even in those jurisdictions which permit the plaintiff to show a general decline in
business, courts have arbitrarily assumed that the plaintiff's sales would have remained
at a constant level had the disparagement not occurred. See text at note 159 supra. Such
an assumption can lead to inaccurate results. If the plaintiff's sales had been gaining con-
sistently before the disparagement, the jury might reasonably find that they normally
would have continued to rise. Courts should also permit the plaintiff to prove that its
sales remained constant after the disparagement while competitors increased their trade.
While such evidence would not conclusively show a greater loss, it would help the jury
to define damages more accurately.
171. See, e.g., Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70
N.E.2d 401 (1946). Even when the plaintiff could show that some persons who used to
deal with him have ceased, he might thereby describe only part of his loss. The disparage-
ment might have discouraged unknown persons from dealing with him for the first time.
172. See, e.g., Landstrom v. Thorpe, 189 F.2d 46, 54-5 (8th Cir. 1951).
173. A federal court will issue an order requiring a party to produce relevant docu-
ments in his "possession, custody or control." FED. R. Civ. P. 34. State statutes commonly
provide discovery procedures which permit acquisition of an opposing party's documents,
See, e.g., Chappell, The Discovery Process in Virginia, 37 VA. L. Rav. 151, 154 et seq,
(1951); Denecke, Discovery in State and Federal Courts, 31 OaM L. REV. 197, 208-09
(1952); Note, [1950] U. oF ILL. L. FoRum 469.
174. See 5 WIGMORE §§ 1517-20, passim.
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accrued,'7 5 financial inability to carry a large loss over an extended period
may force prompter action. Damage to good will is not too speculative to
warrant consideration. It is a well-recognized ground for recovery in defama-
tion and other tort actions. 170 As long as the plaintiff can show what losses
have already resulted, the jury has a basis for gauging the extent to which
future sales will suffer. For the sake of accuracy, the court should instruct
the jury to consider to what degree the plaintiff can restore good will by
175. Research reveals no case in which a court has decided what statute of limita-
tions applies to disparagement. Pennsylvania bars all "actions on the case for words"
brought more than one year after the publication. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 31 (Purdon,
1930). Some jurisdictions impose a short limitation period both for defamation and for
any other "injury not arising out of contract." Ai..- CoDE ANN. tit. 7, § 26 (1940) (one
year); ALAsKA Comp. LAWS § 55-2-7 (1948) (two years). Others provide the game limi-
tation period for defamation actions and for actions to compensate injury to "goods or
chattels" or to "personal property." E.g., IND. STAT. ANN. § 2-602 (Bums, Cum. Supp.
1951) (two years); ID. CODE tit. 57, § 1 (1951) (one year); Mo.rT. REv. CoDsz tit. 93,
§§ 2606, 2607 (Choate & Wertz, 1947) (two years).
But most statutes do not indicate clearly the period which would apply to disparage-
ment. Many jurisdictions impose a short limitation period on defamation actions but
allow a considerably longer one for actions to compensate injury to goods or to personal
property. E.g., CoLo. STAT. ANN. c. 102, §§ 1, 2 (1935) (defamation one year, "injuring
goods" six years); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11 (1943) (defamation two years, injury to
goods three) ; ILu- ANN. STAT. c. 83, §§ 14, 16 (Smith-Hurd, 1935) (defamation one year,
injury to personal property five) ; MiNmN. STAT. ANN. §§ 541.05, 541.07 (1946) (defamation
tvo years, injuring personal property" six); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-143(4), 10-145(1)
(1952) (defamation two years, injuring goods or chattels six). It is impossible to predict
whether courts in such a jurisdiction will analogize disparagement to defamation or loo!:
at it merely as one method of injuring goods or personal property. Two courts have
decided that the defamation period applies to actions for slander of title. Woodward v.
Pacific Fruit & Produce Co., 165 Ore. 250, 106 P.2d 1043 (1940) ; Buehrer v. Provident
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 37 Ohio App. 250, 174 N.E. 597 (1930). Contra: Reliable
Mfg. Co. v. Vaughan Novelty Mfg. Co., 294 Ill. App. 601, 13 N.E2d 518 (1938). A
court which applies the defamation period of limitation to slander of title might e._'tend
it to disparagement as well
In some jurisdictions the statute of limitations specifies that the shorter period applies
only to actions for injury to the plaintiff's "person or reputation." E.g., IowVA CoDz Am:.
§ 6143 (1949); N.M. ST.AT. AxN. §§ 27-107 (1941); Thx. RE-. Cwi. STtT. § 5524 (1941).
Courts seldom hold that statements disparaging the quality of goods reflect on the reputa-
tion of the plaintiff. See pp. 71-2 sitpra. Hence, courts in a jurisdiction with such a statute
might be less prone to apply the defamation period to disparagement actions. A Texas
court has held, in fact, that the defamation statute does not apply to an action against
a conspiracy seeking to injure the plaintiff's business by circulating false statements about
the plaintiff's solvency. Brown v. American Freehold Land Mortgage Co., 97 Tex. 599,
80 S.W. 985 (1904). The imputations were of a kind which courts generally consider
defamatory. See note 37 supra.
176. See Wright, Tort Responsibility for Destruction of Good lVill, 14 Cor;. LQ.
298 (1929). In addition to recognizing injury to good will in defamation, courts have
compensated for its loss in actions for misrepresentation, invasion of the plaintiff's pri-
vacy, and trade mark infringement. Ibid.
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publicizing a favorable verdict.177 The court's power to reduce excessive
damages provides a safeguard against unjust awards.
178
Disparagement recoveries should also include damages for breaches of con-
tract caused by the disparagement. Denying liability because the contract was
technically breached by a third party is unrealistic. The disparager is as cul-
pable as the breaching party. In such a situation the injured party should be
able to collect from either wrong-doer. 79 And incorporating recovery in the




The traditional rule is that equity will not enjoin a defamatory utterance
unless it amounts to a breach of trust or contract.181 Courts have even refused
to impose temporary restraint pending the determination of an action for
damages. 82 Denials of equity jurisdiction have rested on two grounds: the
defendant's right to jury trial 183 and the unconstitutionality of prior restraints
on speech.' 8 '
177. The plaintiff may inform his established clientele of a favorable verdict. If,
however, his clientele is unknown to him, this method of mitigating injury may be im-
practical. And in any case the plaintiff cannot reach persons dissuaded by the disparage-
ment from dealing with him for the first time.
178. See discussion in Comment, 30 TEx. L. Ray. 242 (1951) ; Note, 87 U. or PA.
L. Ray. 980 (1939).
179. In general, when the conduct of two tort-feasors has jointly caused injury to the
plaintiff, either wrong-doer can be held liable to the full extent of the plaintiff's injury.
PRossER 1102-05. Although the two wrong-doers effectuating a breach of contract via
disparagement would have to be sued on two distinct theories-one on contract and one
in tort-the fact that they have both wrongfully contributed to the plaintiff's loss should
render them both liable.
180. Such consolidation would avoid any outstanding problems concerning joinder of
actions. See note 163 supra. It would also help the forgetful plaintiff by allowing him to
amend his complaint to include damages for breach of contract, even after the statute of
limitations period had run. See CLARK, CODE PLEADING 729-34 (2d ed. 1947).
181. Kidd v. Horry, 28 Fed. 773 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1886); Montgomery Ward & Co.
v. United Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Employees, 400 Ill. 38, 79 N.E,2d 46
(1948) ; Finnish Temperance Society Sovittaja v. Riavaaja Pub. Co., 219 Mass. 28, 106
N.E. 561 (1914) ; Voltube Corp. v. B. & C. Insulation Products, Inc., 20 N.J. Super. 250,
89 A.2d 713 (1951) ; see Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., 114 Mass. 69 (1873).
See also National Life Insurance Co. v. Myers, 140 Ill. App. 392 (1908) (libel constitut-
ing breach of contract enjoined).
In addition to refusing to impose restraint, one court denied the plaintiff's request for
a mandatory injunction ordering the defendant to publish a retraction. Finnish Temper-
ance Society Sovittaja v. Riavaaja Pub. Co., mupra.
182. Kidd v. Horry, 28 Fed. 773 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1886); Dartmore Corp. v. Columbia
Products Corp., 18 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
183. E.g., Citizens' Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery Light & Water Power
Co., 171 Fed. 553 (M.D. Ala. 1909); Gariepy v. Springer, 318 Ill. App. 523 (1943).
184. Willis v. O'Connell, 231 Fed. 1004 (S.D. Ala. 1916) ; Citizens' Light, Heat &
Power Co. v. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co., 171 Fed. 553 (M.D. Ala. 1909);
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Many American courts also refuse to enjoin disparagement because of jury
trial and free speech considerations.' 8 5 Early decisions mistook disparage-
ment for defamation, 8 6 and thus established, the principle has persisted."1 7
Only a single federal court of appeals has expressly refused to extend the
defamation rule to disparagement. 8s
Both defamation and disparagement, however, are frequently enjoined.2
8s
Most jurisdictions, while paying lip service to the "no injunction" rule, have
circumscribed it by restraining any statement accompanied by an act which
in itself provides a recognized ground for equity jurisdiction.co When dis-
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. United Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Employees,
400 111. 38, 79 N.E.2d 46 (1948).
185. A. Hollander & Son, Inc. v. Joseph Hollander, Inc., 117 N.J. Eq. 578, 177 At.
80 (1935) ; Mc' orries v. Hudson Sales Corp., 233 S.W.2d 938 (Te.,:. Civ. App. 1950);
see Note, The Law of Unfair Competition in Illinois, [1950] U. oF Iu.. L F. u-. 675.
186. Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., 114 Mass. 69 (1873); Marlin Fire
Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.Y. 384, 64 N.E. 163 (1902).
187. See cases cited note 184 supra.
188. Black & Yates, Inc. v. Mahogany Ass'n, Inc., 129 F2d 227 (3d Cir. 1941), on
rehearin , id. at 232, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 672 (1942) ; cf. Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
United Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Employees, 400 IlL 38, 49-50, 79 N.E.2d
46, 51-2 (1948). Another federal court of appeals held that a plaintiff may procure an in-
junction, without discussing contrary precedents. Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader
Press, Inc., 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939), reversing 24 F. Supp. 1004 (XV.D. Okla.
1938).
The Black & Yates decision held that the Delaware courts recognized a cause of ac-
tion for disparagement. Black & Yates, Inc. v. Mahogany Ass'n, Inc., smfra at 233. The
defendants argued that since Delaware precedent forbade the injunction of disaragement,
the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), prevented the federal court from
enjoining. Id. at 232. Although assuming that Delaware law, was applicable, the court
held that Erie binds the federal courts only to "substantive rights," and that the federal
court retained the power to decide what remedy should be granted. Id. at 233; see 31
GEo. L.J. 224 (1943). Were the Black & Yates decision to stand, litigants might find
injunctions more readily available in federal court than in a state forum. It is not un-
likely, however, that re-litigation of the Eric question in other federal courts would pro-
duce an opposite result. Since 1941 the Supreme Court has held that Eric's application
does not depend on technical distinctions between substantive and procedural law. Guar-
anty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). Eric means to assure
that "the outcove of a controversy for the diversity litigant in a federal court shall not
differ from that of a litigant in the state court." Note, 61 YA. .J. 1206, 1212 (1952).
A federal court might adopt this view to deny injunctive relief when it would not be
available in state court.
189. English courts, not bound by constitutional provisions, enjoin defamation and
disparagement, although there is some question whether the courts of chancery developLed
the doctrine themselves or took jurisdiction only after the Judicature Act of 1873. See
Green, Relational Interests, 30 ILL. L. REv. 1, 39-40 (1935). At least one distinguished
commentator has concluded that the use of the injunction came as a judicial develop-
ment, not as a product of legislation. 2 Nims, U.Fam CompzirtoN .. TnaEE. nFs
830-5 (4th ed. 1947).
190. "[W]hen there is other legitimate ground for equity to issue the injunction, the
fact that the publication is also a libel will not prevent the injunction being issued."
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paragement occurs in combination with enjoinable competitive torts--notably
appropriation of trade relations and interference with contract, courts will
prohibit the whole course of unlawful conduct.1 1 Equity will also intervene
when the defendant, in addition to derogating the plaintiff's product, intimi-
dates those dealing with the plaintiff by threats of suit or withdrawal of
trade.192 Disparagement undertaken solely to force another to grant the dis-
parager an undeserved economic benefit may fall within equity's jurisdiction
to restrain "coercion."' 193 The fact that more than one defendant is respon-
sible for the disparagement may indicate to the court the existence of an en-
joinable conspiracy to harm the plaintiff's business. 1 4 The alacrity with which
some courts find coercion and conspiracy to injure indicates a growing dis-
satisfaction with precedents forbidding injunctive restraint.10 5
Yood v. Daly, 37 Ohio App. 574, 576, 174 N.E. 779 (1930). For a general discussion,
see 2 NIms, op. cit. supra note 189, at 850-71.
191. E.g., Pure Milk Producers Ass'n v. Bridges, 146 Kan. 15, 68 P.2d 658 (1937);
Downey v. United Weather Proofing, Inc., 253 S.W.2d 976 (Mo. 1953); Shevers Ice
Cream Co. v. Polar Products Co., 194 N.Y. Supp. 44 (Sup. Ct. 1921); but cf. Citizens'
Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co., 171 Fed. 553, 557
(M.D. Ala. 1909).
192. Courts usually invoke this doctrine when the defendant has stated that the plain-
tiff's product infringes a patent or trademark and has threatened to sue plaintiff's cus-
tomers if they continue to buy from the plaintiff. E.g., Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co.,
35 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 737 (1930) (alternative ground);
Grand Rapids School Furniture Co., 92 Mich. 558, 52 N.W. 1009 (1892) ; cf. Citizens'
Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co., 171 Fed. 553, 557
(M.D. Ala. 1909). Contra: Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., 114 Mass. 69
(1873). If the defendant has actually brought a patent or trademark infringement suit
against the plaintiff's customers, he may be enjoined. See discussion in 2 Nims, op. cit.
supra note 189, at 868-71. If, in addition to making false statements, the defendant
harasses the -plaintiff by bringing frivolous suits against him, an injunction may issue.
Russell v. Russell, 127 N.J. Eq. 555, 14 A.2d 540 (1940).
For a case in which the court granted an injunction on the grounds that the defen-
dants were threatening to withdraw trade from a third party in an effort to get him to
disparage the plaintiff's product, see Davis v. New England Ry. Pub. Co., 203 Mass. 470,
89 N.E. 565 (1909).
193. E.g., Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., 243 Ala. 600, 11 So.2d 383 (1943); accord,
Yood v. Daly, 37 Ohio App. 574, 174 N.E. 779 (1930) ("coercion and intimidation"),
194. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. Wahlgren, 1 F. Supp. 799 (N.D. Ill. 1932), aff'd,
68 F.2d 660 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 639 (1934) ; Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg.
Co., 35 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 737 (1930) (alternative ground) ;
accord, Russell v. Russell, 127 N.J. Eq. 555, 14 A.2d 540 (1940) ; see 30 COL. L. REV. 510,
515 (1930) ; Nims, Unfair Competition By False Statements or Disparagement, 19 CoRN.
L.Q. 63, 65 (1933) ; but see Lawrence Trust Co. v. Sun-American Pub. Co., 245 Mass.
262, 266, 139 N.E. 655, 656 (1923) (granting injunction on other grounds); Citizens'
Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co., 171 Fed. 553, 558
(M.D. Ala. 1909).
195. In one case, the court enjoined on a finding of "coercion and intimidation" where
it appeared only that a rabbi had repeatedly said that the plaintiff's meat was not kosher.
Yood v. Daly, 37 Ohio App. 574, 174 N.E. 779 (1930). Another court intimated that if
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The same discontent appears from many recent decisions which simply by-
pass the jury trial and free speech objections to enjoining defamation and
disparagement. This is commonly accomplished by classifying as an enjoinable
tort what is actually a derogatory statement and nothing more."" Courts are
wont to classify the gravamen of the action as "unfair competition" and enjoin
it. 9 7 When the offending conduct is viewed generically as interference with
the plaintiff's business or destruction of his property, the defamation or dis-
paragement is considered merely "incidental" to the accomplishment of that
end.'9 s One court, under aggravated circumstances, enjoined because the con-
duct was "more than a mere libel," without dignifying the issue with a
rationale.199
Assuming that equity will take jurisdiction, the cause of action differs from
that for damages only because the plaintiff must show that his remedy at law
is inadequate to protect him fully.200 One ground for inadequacy is continu-
ing publication,20 ' or else the threat of renewal which would result in a multi-
more than one individual had participated in the conduct, it would have enjoined. Robert
E. Hicks Corp. v. National Salesmen's Training Ass'n, Inc., 19 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1927).
196. To a large degree, plaintiffs have succeeded in steering the courts past consti-
tutional objections by framing their pleadings to avoid mention of defamation and dis-
paragement. See Green, Relational Interests, 30 Ia.. L RMv. 1, 42 (1935).
197. Bourjois, Inc. v. Park Drug Co., 82 F.2d 46S (8th Cir. 1936); Dehydro, Inc. v.
Tretolite Co., 53 F.2d 273 (N.D. Okla. 1931) ; Schering & Glatz, Inc. v. American Phar-
maceutical Co., 261 N.Y. 304, 185 N.E. 109 (1933), reversing 236 App. Div. 315, 258 N.Y.
Supp. 504 (1st Dep't 1932) ; Old Investors' & Traders' Corp. v. Jenkins, 133 Misc. 213,
232 N.Y. Supp. 245 (Sup. Ct. 1928), affd, 225 App. Div. 860, 233 N.Y. Supp. 845 (1st
Dep't 1929); see Wolff, Unfair Competition By Truthlfl Disparagement, 47 YUXt UJ.
1304 (1938).
198. Menard v. Houle, 298 Mass. 546, 11 N.E.2d 436 (1937) Gibraltar Savings &
Building Ass'n v. Isbell, 101 S.W.2d 1029 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Kenderdine v. Rou-
land, 260 Ill. App. 194 (1931) ; Lawrence Trust Co. v. Sun-American Pub. Co., 245 Mass.
262, 139 N.E. 655 (1923). All of these cases involved non-competitors, so that the courts
could not employ the "unfair competition" rationale.
199. Saxon Motor Sales, Inc. v. Torino, 166 Misc. 863, 2 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Sup. CL
1938); see Singer v. Romerrick Realty Corp., 255 App. Div. 715, 5 N.Y.S2d 607 (2d
Dep't 1938) (dissenting opinion).
200. Gariepy v. Springer, 315 Ill. App. 523 (1943) (alternative holding). This is the
usual doctrine where equity acts to enforce legal rights. 1 PosUEoy, EQuITY JUmIsrnu-
DEnxcE 367 (5th ed., Symon, 1941).
Courts have not insisted that the plaintiff plead his damages with the same particu-
larity required in an action for damages. E.g., Schering & Glatz, Inc. v. American Phar-
maceutical Co., 261 N.Y. 304, 185 N.E. 109 (1933), reversing 236 App. Div. 315, 258
N.Y. Supp. 504 (1st Dep't 1932) ; Carter -. Knapp Motor Co., 243 Ala. 600, 11 So2d
383 (1943); Menard v. Houle, 298 Mass. 546, 11 N.E2d 436 (1937) ; but cf. Eversharp,
Inc. v. Pal Blade Co., 182 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1950). Compare cases cited notes 155-6
supra. In some measure, this is due to the fact that courts sometimes find the plaintiff's
remedy at law inadequate because money damages are difficult to compute. See te.%t at
note 204 infra.
201. Gariepy v. Springer, 318 Ill. App. 523, 529 (1943) ; Davis v. New England Ry.
Pub. Co., 203 Mass. 470, 479, 89 N.E. 565, 566 (1909).
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plicity of suits. 202 The fact that the defendant is insolvent may render the
plaintiff's legal remedy inadequate.20 3 Difficulty in ascertaining money dam-
ages tends to demonstrate the inadequacy of action at law.20 4 But indicating
that fact may boomerang by suggesting that the plaintiff cannot prove the
"special" damages necessary for recovery. 20 r A court may deny injunctive
relief when convinced that the plaintiff could not have succeeded at law.200
And the plaintiff who has joined legal and equitable actions may find that he
is winning an injunction only at the price of losing his damage suit.
The current grounds for equity jurisdiction are unsatisfactory. Restraining
a statement only when the plaintiff can show coercion, intimidation, con-
spiracy, or some other accompanying tort discriminates arbitrarily. A plain-
tiff who cannot invoke those magic words may suffer as great an injury as
one who can. The rule against enjoining defamation and disparagement rests
on the categorical premise that values of free speech and jury trial outweigh
any possibilities of irreparable injury to business or property. Use of the
rationale that the conduct was "unfair competition" or that the libel was
merely "incidental" to property damage suggests that individual judges now
weigh constitutional values against the chances of injury in each particular
case.20 7 As a result, predictability has decreased as courts have become more
inclined to grant injunctive relief. No orderly system of redress will appear
202. Dehydro, Inc. v. Tretolite Co., 53 F.2d 273 (N.D. Okla. 1931).
203. Wolf v. Harris, 267 Mo. 405, 184 S.W. 1139 (1916) ; accord, Kenderdine v. Rou-
land, 260 Ill. App. 194, 207 (1931) ; National Life Insurance Co. v. Myers, 140 I11. App.
392, 403 (1908).
204. Dehydro, Inc. v. Tretolite Co., 53 F.2d 273 (N.D. Okla. 1931) ; Carter v. Inapp
Motor Co., 243 Ala. 600, 603, 11 So.2d 383, 384-5 (1943) ; Davis v. New England Ry.
Pub. Co., 203 Mass. 470, 479, 89 N.E. 565, 566 (1909) ; National Life Insurance Co. v.
Myers, 140 Ill. App. 392, 403 (1908).
205. See pp. 90-6 supra.
206. E.g., Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.Y. 384, 64 N.E. 163 (1902).
207. The more recent decisions may reflect a general feeling that improved methods
of communication, permitting speedy, wholesale dissemination of false information, re-
quire faster and more thorough redress for injured businesses. See 2 Nims, op. cit. m.ria
note 189, at 828-9.
Even when a court of equity will take jurisdiction, it may refuse to grant an injunc-
tion so broad in scope that it.would proscribe lawful conduct. Thus where plaintiff prayed
that the court restrain defendant Jrpm "appraising diamonds in the City of Hot Springs,"
the court refused to enjoin on the ground that defendant had a right to pursue his trade
lawfully. The only unlawful conduct was falsely underestimating the value of the dia-
monds sold by plaintiff. Esskay Art Galleries v. Gibbs, 205 Ark. 1157, 172 S.W.2d 924
(1943). But even a broad injunction may be sustained, if it prohibits only false state-
ments and other unlawful conduct. Pure Milk Producers Ass'n v. Bridges, 146 Kan. 15,
68 P.2d 658 (1937).
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until courts delve beyond the jumbled decisions to consider the real social
and constitutional values at stake.
Decisions denying equity jurisdiction because the First Amendment forbids
prior restraints on speech 203 misstate constitutional doctrine. In applying the
prior restraint theory, the Supreme Court has drawn an unmistakable dis-
tinction between "public" and "private" speech. Discussion of religion, poli-
tics, and social and economic problems has been protected. -'19 But the Court
has permitted previous restraint of expressions concerning ordinary commer-
cial affairs.2 1 0 Hence it has no apparent objection to enjoining business de-
famation and disparagement,211 at least so long as the standards governing
relief are not arbitrary enough to violate due process.
A number of cases have refused to enjoin on the ground that the defendant
208. While the First Amendment does not in itself prohibit state action, its guaran-
tees are embodied in due process of law, safeguarded from state invasion by the Four-
teenth Amendment. Near v. Minnesota, 2.33 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) ; see Whitney v. Cali-
fornia, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (concurring opinion).
209. Undoubtedly the most famous case is Near v. Minnesota, 233 U.S. , 7 ( 1931,
41 YALE LJ. 262, 31 COL. L. REv. 1148. The Near case struck doa a qatutv
which authorized state courts to enjoin defamatory utterances unless the defendant
could prove that his statements were true and that he published them with "goLA m,,tives."
Ibid. In addition to the injunction, the three devices held tv impose previtus restraint are
permit requirements, license taxes, and registration provisions. W\hen used to suppress
"public"' speech, all three have fallen before the First Amendment. E.g., Cazitwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (permit requirements); Follett v. Town of McCormick,
321 U.S. 573 (1944) (license tax) ; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 539 (1945) (regis-
tration). But the prior restraint doctrine does not prevent municipalities fr-2m regulat-
ing "loud and raucous noises." Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). Nor des it fvrbid
regulation of organized parades, so long as the purpose of such regulation is t., awid
congestion in the streets. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
210. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). See also Pittsford v. City of Los
Angeles, 50 Cal. App.2d 25, 122 P.2d 535 (1942) ; Resnick, Freedom of Spech a:d Cow-
,wercial Solicitation, 30 CAIrF. L. REv. 655 (1942). The I'alenti:e case upheld an ordin-
ance which inevitably would have fallen, had it been applied to "public" speedh. Conv;,re
Valentine v. Chrestensen, supra, uith Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 553 (1943) ; Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) ; Schneider v. State, 303 U.S. 147 (1939) ; Lovel
v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1933).
The Supreme Court has made it clear that those of its decisions which apply the prior
restraint doctrine to "public" speech must not be carried over into the field of "private'
speech. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, supra, at 165; Near v. Minnesota, mitra note 203,
at 716.
211. In addition to citing the First Amendment, courts have refused to enjoin because
of free speech guarantees embodied in state constitutions. See cases cited note 134 supma.
A typical provision certifies that "[e]very person may freely speak, write, and publish on
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty." Iu. CoNsT, art. 2, § 4. Also
see, e.g., N.Y. CoNsT., art. I, § 8; OR CoNsr., art. I, § 3. For a summary of the state
guarantees, see CHFEE, Far= SPEECH IN THE UxrrD STATEs 5 n2 (1943).
Such language is less categorical than that of the First Amendment It is difficult to
see why state provisions should invalidate action which the federal Constitution would
sanction.
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has a right to be heard by a jury. State constitutions safeguard the right of
jury trial as it existed when the state's constitution was enacted.2 12 Defama-
tion necessitates trial by jury.213 Although the disparagement action may
have congealed only after the earlier constitutions were enacted, 21" it is the
sort of action which the common law would have tried to a jury.215 As such,
it requires a jury trial now.2 16 But the courts' hands are not immovably
tied. In an action at law a court has long been able to take a case away from
the jury when the evidence favors one party so preponderantly that it leaves
no genuine disputes of fact.217 A court could grant an injunction whenever
the evidence is so one-sided that it would have demanded a directed verdict
for the plaintiff in an action at law.218 In such a situation, since the questions
of fact would never have gone to the jury, the defendant could not assert his
right. If plaintiff brings a single suit, praying both for damages and an in-
junction to restrain repetition of the statement, the court could reserve de-
cision on the injunction until the jury gives its verdict. If the jury finds for
the plaintiff, the court could then enjoin; if the verdict is for the defendant,
it could not.
The bare minimum which the guarantees of jury trial require is that a court
of equity impose no restraint before holding a hearing to determine whether
the offensive statement is false.219 Even if the constitutions did not command
212. E.g., Tillery v. Commercial National Bank of Anniston, 241 Ala. 653, 655-6, 4
So.2d 125, 127 (1941); Corcoran v. City of Chicago, 373 Ill. 567, 575, 27 N.E.Zd 451,
455 (1940). The federal litigant is similarly assured of the right to jury trial by the
Seventh Amendment. See discussion in 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrics 38.08(5) (2d ed.
1948).
213. E.g., Ryan v. City of Warrensburg, 342 Mo. 761, 771, 117 S.W.2d 303, 308
(1938).
214. The earliest case in the United States appeared to recognize an action on the
case in a disparagement context, but barred recovery because the offending statement was
not factual but opinionative. Johnson v. Hitchcock, 15 Johns. 185 (N.Y. 1818). And
twelve years later the action-though still nameless-was clearly recognized. Tobias v.
Harland, 4 Wend. 537 (N.Y. 1830).
215. Slander of title, from which disparagement grew, see note 53 supra, has tradi-
tionally ranked as a common law action on the case. See KiaRaLv, THn ACrION O TIlE
CAS E 130-2 (1951). An action on the case was tried to a jury as early as the Four-
teenth Century. Id. at 3.
216. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bellino, 320 Mass. 635, 639, 71 N.E.2d 411, 415, ccri.
denied, 330 U.S. 832 (1947) :
"[T]he constitutional declaration of the right to trial by jury . . . [is] the
enunciation of a broad, living principle capable of reasonable adaptation to
a constantly changing society, and not a barren congealing into rigidity of
existing forms...."
Also see Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372,392 (1943).
217. See James, Functions of Judge and Jury In Negligence Cases, 58 YA=E L.J. 667
(1949).
218. See Handler, supra note 155, at 200.
219. Obviously, no court can decide whether the evidence would have warranted a
directed verdict at law until each party has had an opportunity to present his side of
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such a result, sound policy would recommend it. Truthful disparagement has
a positive social value.2 ° And restraining either defamatory or disparaging
statements before ascertaining their falsity might permit an unscrupulous
business to suppress unfavorable-but legally unobjectionable-publications
long enough to cause the publisher unwarranted difficult), or expense.2'
Hasty judicial action may concoct a cure worse than the disease.
Should disparagement law improve enough to allow realistic damage re-
coveries, the need for equitable relief would recede."" But courts should not
regard such reform as a panacea; at times the plaintiff's remedy at law,- would
still be inadequate. The defendant's insolvency can make a money judgment
meaningless. 22 As a practical matter, a person would be audacious to repeat
a statement which had already embroiled him in a serious damage action.24
Should repetition occur, however, equity should act to save the plaintiff from
the harassment of multiple suits. Most important of all, equity should not
hesitate to intervene when money damages are difficult to compute. The mer-
chant's greatest curse may be the statement which causes damage only to his
"broad picture," but which nonetheless hits him hard.2 =
the case. Therefore the procedure of issuing a temporary restraining order on the basis
of an ex parte application cannot and should not be adopted here.
Doctrinally speaking, the issue of the statement's falsity is but one of the factual issues
upon which the court must pass. It seems, however, that falsity is the question which
will most often constitute the crux of the argument. Where the plaintiff seeks to enjoin
continuing publication, he may have no difficulty persuading the court of the defendant's
negligence. See note 224 infra. And he may invoke equity on the very ground that he
cannot prove money damages. See note 225 infra. A court would have to hear evidence
on these issues, of course, but the statement's falsity apparently would remain the central
issue.
220. See p. 83 supra.
221. This would be especially onerous where discontinuing the statement would neces-
sitate withdrawing an entire book or magazine from circulation.
222. At least partially because the damage action has remained so inadequate, there
has arisen considerable agitation for injunctive relief against disparagement. See, e.g.,
Handler, svpra note 155, at 198-200; Nims, Unfair Compeition by False Statements or
Disparageewnt, 19 Comx. LQ. 63, 69-70 (1933).
223. Even where the plaintiff cannot collect on his judgment, he may regain some of
his clientele by publicizing the verdict. But see note 177 .supra.
224. Each time the defendant repeats his statement, the plaintiff will find it easier to
recover. Indicating that sales fell each time the defendant acted may prove a causal
relation which the plaintiff could not prove if the defendant disparaged only once. See
note 140 supra and accompanying text. Furthermore, proving that the defendant should
have known that his statement was false will become progressively more simple; after
the first disparagement, the plaintiff can make sure that responsible persons inform the
defendant of his error. See notes 92-3 supra and accompanying text.
225. "No one can deny that damage is done to a manufacturer when his firm or
products are disparaged or defamed by a competitor...
"Under our present laws, however, the difficulty lies in translating the damage done
to good will in dollars and cents.... [T]hat is an almost impossible task.
"Also, individual instances are of such petty consequences that they really don't justify
1953]
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CONCLUSION
While courts' handling of business defamation is effective, the present dis-
paragement action is sorely in need of rejuvenation. Requiring proof that
the defendant intended to injure the plaintiff's business can strangle justifi-
able claims; restrictive damage formulae fail to measure injury competently
and often act as a substantive bar to recovery. Basing liability on the defen-
dant's negligence will rationally balance conflicting social policies, and liber-
alized standards of compensation will permit more accurate recovery. State-
ments defaming a business or disparaging its product can constitutionally be
enjoined when a jury has returned a plaintiff's verdict or when the court
would have directed such a verdict in an action at law. By bolstering virile
damage actions with intelligent use of the injunction, courts can arm the
modern businessman with weapons he needs to fight defamation and dis-
paragement.
action. It is only on the broad picture that damage is felt and it is on this broad level
that it is next to impossible to prove loss."
Confidential communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from trade association officer.
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